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information and communication technology policy debate. A companion report has
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debate in Norway.
Eric J. Iversen has written about general tendencies in the debate (chapter 2), about
the EU policy discussion specifically (chapter 3), about the OECD (chapter 5), and
he has compiled the appendix. Finn Ørstavik has written about the US discussion
(chapter 4), the abstract, and has compiled the pieces into a report format. Keith
Smith has written the introduction (chapter 1).

vAbstract
The objective of this report is to describe and analyse policy debates on information
and communication technology (ICT) in Norwegian and international policy milieus.
While there are many directions from which such debates could be analysed, we
approach the issue in terms of basic policy concepts, by considering
Ø how policymakers see the economic and social significance of information- and
communication technology, and
Ø how they see their own role in relation to information- and communication
technology.
In doing this, we try to go beyond superficial observations and the generally
speculative ideas which are often presented as a rationale for ICT policy. We seek to
come to grips with underlying issues, by focussing on
Ø the ways in which information- and communication technology is
conceptualised, and
Ø the background assumptions which policymakers are adopting at the present time
when discussing this technology.
Against this background, we seek to evaluate the quality of the documentation,
information and analysis which is available for and used by policy makers in
international institutions, such as the EU and the OECD, and in policy milieus in the
USA.
In terms of theoretical perspectives, there are two particular themes that we will be
interested in the course of the subsequent analysis. They are (i) technological
determinism and (ii) innovation systems.
(i) A longstanding feature of ICT policy debates has been to place the effects and
impact of new technology in the foreground, while the mechanisms that generate
new technology, and the selection processes which decide between technological
alternatives and development directions, have been more or less ignored. In much
discussion of ICT, technical change itself has been taken for granted, as if changes
are presented to society, rather than being a product of social actions among
members of society. An important emerging development in the ICT debate is that
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there is now some awareness that technology development in itself is a social product
and an expression of social factors and policy strategies.
(ii) The second theme we deal with is closely related to the previous one. It concerns
the fact that innovation happens in a social context, and that innovation presupposes
that many agents take part in an interactive process, where something new is created.
Policy rhetoric in the post-war period has to a large degree been built around  ‘linear’
concepts of innovation. Arguments seem to presuppose that pure scientific research
is the ultimate engine of change, and that innovation in the market is mere
exploitation of ready-made novelties presented to the economic agents by scientists.
Recent analyses of innovation, however, tell us that innovation is primarily an
interactive process, both inside firms, and between firms and other organisations and
institutions. Research is not necessarily the driving force of innovation – it is rather
that science and technological development are part of a problem-solving process in
which many actors are involved. There are important complementarities and
reciprocities between activities in science, applied technology and in commercial
business. In the following report we explore some of the implications of this for
R&D policy.
Keywords: Information- and communication technology; ICT; policy debate;
innovation system; determinism.
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1Information and communication technology in
international policy discussions
Chapter 1. The ICT revolution: the conceptual framework
1.1. IT policy and innovation theory
Much of contemporary IT policy rests on the argument that we are moving towards,
or are actually in, a new type of society: an ‘information society’, or a ‘knowledge
society’, resting on information as an economic resource. However the term
‘information society’ is rarely defined or conceptualised in any serious way, and it is
often unclear what its real content is. In this introduction we discuss critically some of
the ideas which underlie the notion that we are moving towards an information
society. This can be approached from various angles; we do so from the point of view
of innovation theory, and of some influential ideas within it.
In a famous passage, Keynes argued that economic policy-makers are often
influenced by theoretical ideas, although they may be unaware of where those ideas
have been developed, and what their strengths and limitations actually are. This point
applies to innovation policy as well as to economic policy - there are often implicit
ideas about the nature of innovation underlying different types of policy approach. In
this introduction we want to explore the impact and validity of one particular set of
ideas, to do with the impact and nature of large-scale technological change. Within
this approach, ICT is seen as the most important technology in a new wave of
economic growth; it is part of what Freeman and Perez call a 'techno-economic
paradigm shift' which is reshaping the economic environment and which is creating an
information society, in which ICT is the central driving force.
This approach derives essentially from Schumpeter’s most influential but probably
least-read book, Business Cycles.  Schumpeter in fact took his argument from the
Soviet economist Nikolai Kondratiev, who argued that in the long-term growth is both
technology driven and cyclical. It is technology driven because processes of invention
and knowledge creation lead to radical innovations which restructure the production
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system, creating major investment opportunities. The emergence of new major
technologies are seen by Schumpeterians as initiating and sustaining ‘cycles’ of
growth. Growth is cyclical because such innovations only occur very occasionally.
How valid are these approaches, and to what extent should they influence IT policy at
the present time? In the following section we outline the theory in more detail, and
then discuss its impacts and validity. We have two basic criticisms of this approach:
the first is that it is technologically determinist – it gives no convincing account of
why and how such technologies develop. Secondly, it misunderstands the problems of
diffusion of the technology, in particular because of a neglect of social factors. These
issues are closely relevant for understanding the evolution of ICT policy, and for ICT
policy debates at the present time.
1.2. ‘Schumpeterian growth’
Large-scale technological change is an obvious feature of the advanced market
economies. Schumpeter’s argument was that from time to time this takes the form of
radical upheavals in the knowledge base which underlies production, and hence large
scale changes in industrial techniques and organisation. Such changes can be
identified far back in human history: the development of agriculture in pre-history, the
transition to water-powered mills in the eleventh century, and so on. Most people have
some historical familiarity with the big shifts of the modern era, in which the pace of
change has quickened. From the late eighteenth century we have had, for example:1
♦ the development of the steam engine, which had major implications for the design
of machinery, factory sizes and structures, and transport systems;
♦ the development of electrical power systems and decentralised dynamo
technologies, once again with major implications for the optimal size of
production units and the application of power to production; but also with
profound implications for the use of electricity in the home.
♦ the development of telecommunications in the first half of the 20th century;
                                                
1
 For an example, see C. Freeman and C. Perez in G. Dosi et al (eds) 1988, pp.38-67.
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♦ the emergence of the modern chemicals technology
♦ the internal combustion engine, with its complex related technologies in oil
production, transport and refining, and the development of the automobile.
These ideas are often systematised into eras or time periods associated with different
types of technology and different types of economic organization. An example is
given below:
STEP report R-14/1998
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Table 1.1: Clusters of pervasive technologies: systems and organization
Period:
˝
1750-1820
˝
1800-1870
˝
1850-1940
˝
1920-2000
˝
1980 -
Dominant technology
system
Water power, sail
shipping, turnpikes,
˝
textiles
Coal, sail shipping,
˝
canals, iron,
˝
steam power,
˝
mechanical
equipment
Railways, steam
ships, heavy industry,
steel, chemicals,
telegraph
Electric power, oil,
nuclear, cars, radio
and TV, consumer
durables, petro-
chemicals
Gas, aircraft, space-
based tele-
communications,
information, opto-
electronics
Emerging system Mechanical
techniques, coal,
stationary steam,
canals
Steel, distributed
energy supply,
telegraph, railways
Electricity, cars,
trucks, radio,
telephone, roads,
chemicals
Nuclear, computers
and IT systems, tele-
communications, air
transport
Biotechnology, AI,
IT-telecom
integration,
Dominant methods
and/or organization
Manufacture,
localised enterprise
Centrally managed
enterprises, joint
stock companies
Standardised parts,
M-form corporation
Fordism/
Taylorism, mass
production, TNCs.
Quality control,
globalised enterprises,
de-centralised
management
Source: Adapted from M. Nakicenovic, "Diffusion of pervasive systems: a case of transport infrastructures", in Nkicenovic and Grubler (eds)
Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behaviour.
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These large-scale technological revolutions have a number of features in common.
They have complex relationships with scientific change (not, it should be
emphasised, taking the form of a one-way causal relationship between science and
technological change). They usually involve inter-related technological advance in a
range of areas. They usually involve change in the organisation of firms. They have
wide cross-industry implications and effects. They always involve some dimension
of social change, and they often have a direct impact on everyday life (through, for
example, the development of consumer electrical products for the home). The ICT
revolution is quite clearly a radical innovation of this type. But what are the real
effects and policy implications of such change? Is this really a productive way to
think about the growth process?
One basic problem in this theory is that that what really matters is not the innovation
of technologies but their diffusion: the problem is to actually apply them, to put them
to work. The point here is that the technological revolutions referred to above are
often very slow to diffuse.2 The Watt steam engine, for example, was patented in
1775, yet it was not in widespread use, even in England, until over a century later. It
had no significant economic impact until at least fifty years after it became
available.3 In communications technology, the telegraph was invented in the 1830s,
but took decades to have a significant effects.4 The "dynamo revolution" in the late
19th century, through which the small-scale electrical motor spread into the factory
system, also took decades: it took around forty years for even fifty percent of
American factories to use the new technology.5 Similar delays occurred in the
domestic use of electricity. Such points might be extended to modern IT
developments: Even where the hardware has spread, very few of the capabilities of
IT are actually in use.  These points mean that for ICT and also for the previous
                                                
2
 The term "slow" here is obviously relative and imprecise; whether diffusion is slow or fast
depends on our expectations and time-scale. The point here is that diffusion of a technically
superior product or process is never instantaneous, and often takes decades.
3
 See N. Von Tunzelmann 1978 for a detailed quantititive ananlysis of the diffusion of the Watt
engine.
4
 See P. Hall and P. Preston 1988, Ch. 4.
5
 P.A. David in E. Deiaco and G. Vickery (eds) (1991).
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‘revolutionary’ technologies,  the productivity and growth impacts of the
technologies are likely to be slow to emerge, and difficult to identify.6
What underlies the slow diffusion patterns? While there are very many factors
involved, there are two important points for our discussion here.
Firstly, no item of technical hardware ever stands alone: it is almost always part of a
complex technical and production system which integrates many technical functions
and activities. Getting a technology such as the automobile into large-scale
production involved solving an enormous number of related technical problems in
chemical engineering (especially related to refining of petroleum), in electrical
technology, in metallurgy, and so on. These problems had to be solved in the context
of building a integrated production system which could actually be managed; this in
turn required the solution of problems in factory architecture, materials handling,
labour recruitment and management, and so on. (In the context of this kind of
complex integration it should be noted that information and communications systems
are a core element of the technical system7
A second problem concerns the relationship between technology and society. The
Schumpeterian approach sees technology as an autonomous driving force, with
society ‘lagging’ behind. The problem is for society to adapt to the new technology.
However this approach has some serious weaknesses. Technology does not exist
autonomously, or independent of society. However technologies always exist within
an economic and social system. Technologies are put to work within particular
organisational structures of particular firms, and within a general social context
which defines the financial environment, the legal context, technical standards, the
supply of scientific and technological skills, social and cultural norms concerning
work, and so on. Very often the use of a technology involves changes and adaptation
in this system. For example, the early factory system was slow to develop in part
because there was little or no social acceptance of the idea of a regular working day.
                                                
6
 This is a well known problem for ICT: the growth and productivity impacts are very
difficult to measure empirically. See Daniel Sichel 1997.
7
 Professor Thomas Hughes has emphasized the systemic elements of innovation in the
electrical power system; he suggests that successful innovators are usually system managers,
and therefore that technologies are always "systems, presided over by system builders". T.P.
Hughes 1983.
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The emergence of electrical power technology in the US involved new forms of
business enterprise (the holding company), legal changes allowing monopoly supply
of electricity, the emergence of electrical engineering as a profession with its own
training methods, plus a wide range of standards for electricity supply and the
operation of electrical products: all of these were based on social changes or
decisions. Automobiles involved new forms of work organisation, new forms of legal
regulation and above all the creation of a vast public infrastructure of roads and
bridges, and an industrial energy infrastructure. Again, these involved either a direct
social change or some form of social decision. The complexity and difficulty of such
large-scale organisational change in the social and infrastructural system is obviously
a vital element determining the speed of diffusion of a new technology.
Innovating a particular piece of hardware is therefore a much simpler matter than
changing the social and technological system in which it is embedded. But technical
change and changes in production systems and the social system go together, and are
time-consuming. With a generic technology such as ICT, the problem is not to
develop the technology but to apply it across industries or across various branches of
public administration or the education system; but each industry, each department,
each school area or each hospital has its own specific systems which must change.
The complexity of this pattern of systemic change, then, is one of the main reasons
underlying the slow diffusion of radical new generic technologies. It is also one of
the reasons why major "clusters" of innovation - such as those we are now
experiencing - do not necessarily lead to immediate or rapid increases in
productivity.
The important question is, to what extent do these arguments apply to recent
developments in Information Technology? We turn now to a discussion of change in
this area and its socio-economic significance.
1.3. The IT Revolution and its policy significance
This section considers three issues, namely the role of information in society, recent
technological change in IT, and the types of policy responses which governments
have made.
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1.3.1. The Economic and Social Significance of Information
Information and communication are increasingly central to the operation of any
economy and society for two principal reasons. First there are informational needs
due to increasing specialisation, especially problems in enterprise organisation and
production control which follow from complex production technologies. Secondly,
there is the increasing knowledge-intensity – in terms of codified scientific or quasi-
scientific knowledges - of industrial production itself. We briefly discuss these
factors in turn.
A clear trend in economic organisation is towards an increasing social and technical
division of labour: that is, towards specialisation in terms of economic activities and
functional tasks. Since the time of Adam Smith this division of labour has been
recognised by economists and others as a primary element in the growth of
productivity, and therefore in the long-run economic growth of the West. Increasing
specialisation does not however mean that activities become isolated from one
another: on the contrary, the need to integrate activities becomes acute, and this gives
rise to significant problems of coordination wherever there is a social and technical
division of labour. Such coordination rests primarily on the production, accessibility
and use of information. These problems of coordination and control in advanced
economies are broadly speaking solved in two ways: on the one hand through arms
length market transactions, and on the other through administrative systems inside
organisations, either vertically integrated enterprises of one kind or another, or linked
groups of companies. Either way, there are significant problems of information
collection, processing and assessment involved.8
A central element in the changing industrial structure and division of labour is of
course the advance of technology itself. The major technological revolutions
described in the previous section all generated increasing problems of production
management and enterprise control which required improved information processing.
In an influential work, Professor James Beniger firmly linked these technological
shifts to the IT revolution:
                                                
8
 J.S. Metcalfe, "Information and some economics of the information revolution", in M.
Ferguson 1986, pp 37-51.
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... national economies constitute open processing systems engaged in  the
continuous extraction, reorganisation and distribution of environmental inputs
to final consumption. Until the last century these functions, even in the
largest and most developed national economies, still were carried on at a
human pace ... so long as the energy used to process and move material
throughputs did not much exceed that of human labour, individual workers in
the system could provide the information processing required for its control.
Once energy consumption, processing and transportation speeds, and the
information requirements for control are seen to be inter-related, the
Industrial Revolution takes on new meaning. By far its greatest impact from
this perspective was to speed up society’s entire material processing system,
thereby precipitating a crisis of control, a period in which innovations in
information processing and communications technologies lagged behind
those of energy and its application to manufacturing and transportation.9
Beniger’s argument is that this "control crisis", which followed from the fact that
information processing capabilities lagged far behind other technological advances,
is the main reason why so much attention and effort has been given to the
development of new information technologies in our time. It is not simply a matter of
technological opportunity springing from the semiconductor revolution; it is driven
by long-standing economic and organisational needs. It should be noted that
innovation in ICT has increasingly been needed not just to solve problems in the
control of production and large organisations, but in the control of information
processing itself.
The informational requirements of advanced production are not limited to industry
itself. Our type of economic system is associated with social complexity and
differentiation, and hence with a need for complex public administration systems,
which also require coordination and which pose major informational problems. It is
these factors which underlie one of the key trends in modern economic development,
which is for the number of persons employed in such tasks to rise. It is this increase
which usually underlies the idea of information as an economic resource and the
concept of the "information economy".
Linked with these issues is the increasing knowledge-intensity and information-
intensity of advanced industrial production. Industrial competition is primarily
technological in the sense that competition is less about price than about the technical
                                                
9
 J. Beniger 1986, p.427.
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characteristics and performance attributes of products. Moreover the appropriate
combination of attributes can change quickly: product cycles seem to be getting
shorter, and producers must try to anticipate such change and to respond quickly and
flexibly. These factors significantly increase the importance of design processes,
production engineering, and quality control in production; at the same time the use of
R&D as a monitoring and information-providing system has increased. All of these
functions involve, in different ways, the production, collection, and modification of
information, and all are strongly affected by changes in IT. Expenditure on these
informational aspects of innovation exceeds spending on investment in fixed capital
in many firms, industries and even whole economies.10
What are the quantitative dimensions of these information functions in our society?
More concretely, what proportion of national economic activity consists of
information activity? How many people are directly affected by the IT revolution?
Given the nature of our economic statistics, it is difficult to know what proportion of
the workforce in a modern economy is employed in the "information sector" and
what proportion of output consists of information. There is no category of
"information equipment" in the production statistics, and information activities
cannot be identified with particular industrial and employment classifications.
However investigations into the relevant dimensions of information as an industry
have been made, mostly in the US. The first significant attempt to overcome the
statistical problems was the work of the economist Fritz Machlup.11 Machlup
reorganised the industrial classification of the US into five major groups of
information activities: education, research, communications, information equipment
and information services. Studying output and employment trends in these activity
groups, he showed through an analysis of the US national accounts that such
activities accounted for 29% of US BNP and 31% of employment in 1958. Moreover
during the previous ten years the information sector had been growing at twice the
                                                
10
 for example, L. Scholz and others estimate the direct and indirect expenditure on innovation
in the Federal Republic of Germany (of which R&D, design, and market preparation are the
most important elements) at 13,9% of GDP, which is higher than the rate of investment in fixed
capital; L. Scholz et al, "Innovation, growth and employment. Innovative activity at plant,
sectoral and intersectorla level and its effects on the West German economy in the 1980s", in R.
Schettkat and M. Wagner (eds) 1990, pp.135-169
11
 F. Machlup 1962 and 1980.
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rate of the economy as a whole, indicating a substantial structural shift in the US
economy. Machlup’s work was significantly extended in the mid-1970s in a very
detailed nine-volume study for the US Department of Commerce by Marc Uri
Porat.12 Dr Porat distinguished between a "primary information sector" consisting of
firms which supplied information goods and services of all kinds, and a "secondary
information sector"  consisting of "all the information services produced for internal
consumption by government and noninformation firms." He showed that the two
sectors taken together accounted for 46% of US BNP, 40% of the workforce, and
53% of labour income. More recent estimates for the mid-1980s suggest that over
50% of the American workforce is now in the information sector, and that nearly
70% of labour costs and 70% of working hours relate to information (since
information workers receive higher wages and work longer hours).13 These
information industries have much higher investment rates than other sectors of the
economy: in the 1980s the capital stock of US "information producing" industries
grew at 5% p.a., while the manufacturing capital stock grew at less than 2% p.a.  It
should be noted in this context that IT investment is concentrated such service
industries, which now own 84% of the US stock of IT equipment. These trends in the
US economy are probably consistent with trends in other advanced economies.
It should be noted that this type of calculation, which has been repeated in many
other societies including Norway, does not necessarily imply that we are involved in
an ‘information society’; if we used exactly the same methodology to calculate the
workforce engaged in the production, processing, distribution and sale of food, we
might well end up with considerably larger numbers. The point here is to emphasize
the integration of activities, and the pervasiveness of information processing across
industries.
                                                
12
 The main body of Dr. Porat’s research is reported in The Information Economy: Definition
and Measurement, 256pp, and The Information Economy: Sources and Methods for
Measuring the Primary Information Sector, 188pp., US Dept of Commerce Office of
Telecommunications, (OT Spec.Pub 77-12-1), 1977.
13
 E.M. Rogers 1986, pp.10-13.
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1.3.2. The Scale of the IT sector
Against this background, it is important to bear in mind that the ICT sector –
meaning the complex of industries which produce ICT equipment – is relatively
small.
If we simply take the basic IT industry, ‘Office equipment and computers’ (ISIC
3825) we can see that there is no OECD economy in which this sector makes up
more than about 2% of manufacturing output (and manufacturing output as a whole
rarely makes up more than 25% of GDP; in Norway manufacturing makes up 17% of
GDP).
Figure 1: Value added in the production of computers 1980-1993.
Verdiskaping i IT-industrien som andel av verdiskaping i industrien
3825
0,0 %
2,0 %
4,0 %
6,0 %
8,0 %
10,0 %
12,0 %
14,0 %
16,0 %
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Germany United States United Kingdom Canada Netherlands Sweden Finland Denmark Norway
Source: OECD, STAN database.
If we extend this by adding in telecommunications equipment, and also scientific and
technical instruments production, then we raise the ICT figure, but it nevertheless
remains a relatively small part of overall manufacturing output, as Figure 2 shows.
Even rapid growth in such a small sector cannot have a major effect on growth rates
of industry; the effects of ICT must therefore be sought in its use in other sectors.
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Figure 2: Value added in IT equipment, telecommunications equipment and scientific
and technical instruments 1980-1993.
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Source: OECD, STAN database.
Given that the size of the sector, however we measure it, is small, it is difficult to see
that the IT industry can make a large direct contribution to economic growth. These
leaves its indirect effects: the idea that it has productivity-enhancing effects across
many industries. The evidence for this is also rather limited, but it nevertheless forms
the basis for many policy ideas. It is to these we now turn.
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Chapter 2: General tendencies in the international ICT-discussion
The purpose of this section is to provide a first impression of the recent tendency of
the ICT-discussion as it is currently taking form around the world. The intention is to
flag some of the main trends we will meet in the current international discussion.
Here, we characterise some general dimensions of the international discussion before
going on to sketch common currents in, (i.) how information technology is
conceived; (ii.) how governments argue for IT policies; and (iii.) how governments
envision their roles in the recent international IT-policy discussion.
2.1. How Information Technology is conceived
In our analysis of key IT-documents the focus on what the concept “information
technology” includes differs significantly. Some documents we have surveyed focus
on individual technologies (semiconductors, consumer electronics etc), and
emphasise the need for industrial support in the development and/or diffusion of
these technologies. Others focus more broadly on ‘information infrastructure’,
entailing the development and use of broadband communication technologies to
connect consumer-premise equipment (CPE) into different types of networks. Of
these infrastructure-oriented documents, some focus on developing national
infrastructure (NII, etc) while a growing set focuses on integrating the national into
‘global’ networks. Not surprisingly, transnational groupings (G7 and OECD)
emphasise this latter set of issues.
A third set of documents moves the discussion away from the technologies
themselves and their expected economic benefits, and focuses increasingly on more
societal aspects. A subset of these emphasises geographical effects of the technology,
including tele-commuting or distributed health services. This is the continuing
regionalisation of the IT-discussion, which especially in Nordic countries is used to
argue for potential benefits of IT infrastructures for rural areas.
The most interesting set of documents, however, are those that discuss the
relationship between society and information technology and endeavour to
understand its changing nature, and with it, the changing challenges to policies.
These documents question the assumptions behind such concepts as ‘convergence’,
16 STEP report R-14/1998
16
‘learning in the information age’ and the ‘information society’, attempt to put them
into perspective and suggest policy-implications.14
2.2. How governments argue for IT-policies.
The rationale used by governments for IT-policies of course depends on the type of
policy measure and the particular context. However, several types of argumentation
can be indicated. In surveying information infrastructure policies (construed broadly)
the OECD identifies several main rationales for IT-policy initiatives. The main
rationale for IT-policies falls under the heading of “Economic growth and
productivity”. The types of initiatives that ‘macro’ policies (meaning largely
government/private cooperative investment in broadband-communication networks
or ‘information infrastructure’), meso-policies (schemes to support/develop national
IT-industries) and micro-level policies (germinating new content industries or firms
and adapting old ones to ‘new challenges’).
Table 2.1: OECD’s characterisation of what governments hope to achieve in their
Information-infrastructure policies
I. Economic growth and productivity
1.1.Job-creation
1.2. Building on national strength and international competition
II. The Geographic impact: regional issues
III. Social and cultural objectives
Source: OECD Information Infrastructure Policies in OECD Countries. OECD /GD
(96) 174.
The OECD gives special mention to government ambitions directed at “job-creation”
and at “building on national strength and international competition”, although these
should be subsumed under the economic growth and productivity heading. The
policy discussion directed at job-creation is generally oriented towards the meso- and
micro-levels. The sector-based focus is generally used to frame expectations of
employment growth effects coming out of the IT-sector. These expectations range
from the general to the specific and among others involve the multimedia sector
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 See respectively, Information Society Forum, June 1996; and Building the European
Information Society The Green Paper on Convergence… and the Implications for
Regulation. EU Commission Com(97) 623; Networks for People and their Communities:
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(where in Japan, for example, it is expected that related jobs will surpass the auto
industry by 2010); the Personal Communications Services Industry (e.g the USA;
where 300, 000 jobs are expected in the course of 10-15 years); or information
services generally (as in France, where jobs connected to the information-services
sector are expected to double to 600,000 by 2005). Meanwhile job destruction
connected to IT is less emphasised, though some (e.g. Denmark) consider the effects
on traditional industry.
Arguments involving ‘building on national strengths/international competition’ are
generally employed in favour of macro- and meso-level initiatives. In assessing these
arguments however it should be noted that ambitions to be internationally
competitive are not always in line with established ‘national strengths’. Indeed much
of the EU argumentation stresses the ‘threat of international competition’ not out of
position of strength but out of one of weakness. Thus it is argued in Europe and other
places that the local IT sector should be built up in order to fend off domination by
leading (US) competitors. This sort of technology-push policy argument, which once
defined IT-policy, is much less apparent in the current policy analysis, though it still
dominates some parts of the discussion.
Arguments involving the geographic impact of IT are used to make the point that IT
infrastructure can create opportunities for rural communities. The emphasis is on
regional policies, generally via rhetoric that emphasises a rejection of urbanisation.
This set of arguments is closely related to the “social and cultural objectives” that the
OECD mentions, especially those concerning distance-learning, IT-commuting and
Tele-medicine. In addition to these, a relatively new area that is being emphasised is
the set of information-based services the government itself is already responsible for.
One such ‘service’ involves education and vocational or professional training, where
the buzzword ‘lifelong learning’ serves to place the need for updating skills and
knowledge on the agenda. Under the heading of cultural objectives one finds very
little in terms of policy initiatives beyond a general outcry against the linguistic
(English) and cultural (US) hegemony perceived on the Web.
                                                                                                                                         
Making the most of the Information Society in the EU for us all. High level expert group.
April 1997, among others.
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In short, despite a certain change of orientation, economic rationales dominate the
way the international community discusses IT-policy. But as the OECD remarks,
“For governments to support the transformation toward the information society,
it is essential to have a clear insight in the social and societal as well as
economic impacts of information infrastructures. Existing statistics, data and
methodology, however, are often inadequate to measure the effects. National
reports do not in analyse this.”15
Thus, it is an irony that the area that receives the greatest attention in the Information
Technology policy-discussion lacks necessary sources of information both in terms
of making diagnoses and in measuring effects of policies.
2.3. How governments envision their role
Whereas there is much variation in the way the policy discussion conceives of IT but
somewhat less diversity in the way IT policies are argued for, there seems to be a
remarkable standardisation in the way the different governments envision their role.
One characteristic of this streak in the recent policy discussion is the pains that are
taken to place the responsibility for the realisation of the information society with the
private sector. The OECD characterises the changing relationship between
governments and industry in the following way:
“The broadening of IT policies is accompanied by a trend in government to
forge cooperative relationships with industry, whereby governments, rather
than trying to direct the course of the IT industry, play a moderating role,
working with industry and important users to set standards, engage in R&D
and undertake diffusion exercises.”16
Thus there is the repeated eagerness in the policy discussion to limit government
activity and emphasise the role of the private sector, although the sincerity of this
eagerness seems to vary (contrast the US Global Infrastructure Initiatives in the US,
where captains of industry are prominent, to the reluctance in Japan to liberalize its
Tele-market). Notwithstanding, a consensus does prevail. One such expression for
such an international consensus mentioned already can be seen in the G-7 ‘core
principles’. Such principles are reinforced by other treaties, such as those within the
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 Information Infrastructure Policies in OECD Countries. OECD/GD (96) 174. P 10.
16
 Information Technology Outlook 1997. OECD, p. 104.
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purview of the WTO including the Singapore Agreement17 (WTO. 1996) for the
elimination of duties on IT products. These principles are as follows:
Table 2.2: The G-7 Ministerial Conference on the Information Society: Core-
principles18
1. Promoting dynamic competition
2. Encouraging private investment
3. Defining an adaptable regulatory framework
4. Providing open access to networks
5. Ensuring universal provision of and access to services
6. Promoting equality of opportunity to the citizen
7. Promoting diversity of content (e.g. Cultural and linguistic diversity)
8. Recognising the necessity of world-wide cooperation, with particular attention
to less-developed countries.
On its side, the OECD has more recently characterised the role of the government as
ideally being that of a “catalyst19”. OECD sees the role of government in the ‘global
information society’ as acting catalytically where regards the development of and
demand for information technology. A second role is more active. Here the OECD
envisions governments becoming much more active taking into use IT-based services
to improve governmental services internally, in administrative tasks, and externally,
in interfacing with the public. This role is increasingly important, not only per se but
also as a demonstration to the general public of the usefulness of such technologies.
There are two aspects of the Government’s role that are becoming increasingly
important. The first involves the question of role of education in the information
society. This is a vexed question which is well analysed in the EU discussion (see
Building the European Information Society for us all,1997). The second role that has
not been emphasised until lately is the government’s active role as a user as well as
developer of electronic information services (EIS). The focus of integrating
electronic information and the government range from making governments more
transparent and open (‘reinventing government’ in the US, or ‘open government’ in
the UK) to diffusing government benefits. Government activity in this field stands
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 See http://www.wto96.org/media/13ipirita.html for the agreement.
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 Referred to in Information Infrastructure Policies in OECD Countries. OECD/GD (96)
174
19
 OECD/ICCP: Global Information Infrastructure - Global Information. Society P 17.
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not only to make government administration more effectively, but it can also serve
an important ‘demonstration’ role in drawing citizens into the widely heralded
‘Information Age’.
21
Chapter 3: The IT policy discussion in Europe
In this section, we analyse the recent IT policy discussion in Europe, specifically
focusing on the role of European institutions and then particularly on the European
Commission. The European policy-discussion is the most comprehensive and
arguably the most relevant for Norway. One of the defining aspects of this discussion
is that it continues to expand (in terms of number of documents) and spread (in terms
of its locus in the political fora). This expansion is concurrent with important
changes in the recent discussion that involve shifts in perpective and orientation. In
the following critical survey, we will be primarily concerned with two such shifts.
The first involves an increasing tendency to emphasise the global-dimension of IT.
The second is more fundamental, involving a change over time from a predominately
technology-push orienation, to one that stresses a demand-side component, towards a
perspecitve that seeks to integrate the development of IT with the development of
society.
3.1 Defining the limits of the discussion: our sample
The European IT discussion is indeed expansive. A collection of IT-policy
documentation collated by the Information Society Project Office (ISPO) 20 indicates
that there are currently over 8600 such documents. These documents represent
varying levels of generality, varying levels of quality and varying levels of the
political process. Further, some are duplicate versions of the same documents while
others are specific technical projects or projects from individual Member States.21
Nonetheless, the amount of written material that reflects the IT-discussion could fit
into a moderate size library.
We will concentrate on a small sample of this huge total. We have narrowed our
focus to generalist policy-measures in the pan-European policy arena, particularly
those that have followed the EU Commission Communication entitled Europe’s way
to the Information Society: an Action plan. (Com (94) 347 final). This
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 The ISPO is a combined effort of DGIII  and DGXIII.
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 For an interesting database covering national IT-discussions in Europe, consult the
European Survey of the Information Society at http://www.ispo.cec.be/esis.
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Communication can be said to have initiated the recent policy discussion as it has
attempted to collect items in the European discussion from various sources and
structure these past and current policy-documents according to four so-called priority
areas. These are:
1. Improving the Business Environment
2. Investing in the Future
3. People at the Centre
4. Meeting the Global Challenge
An overview of the documents that ISPO has categorised according to these priority
areas is reproduced in Annex 1 This system of categorisation of course does not
provide a perfect fit for the increasing number of documents: many overlap the
boundaries while many stretch the meaning of the headings. In preparation for the
analysis below we have recognised a set of EU-related documents which we see as
defining the general IT-discussion currently taking place in Europe. These are
compiled in the box below.
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Box: A Set of Important Documents in the EU IT-Policy Discussion
I. White-Papers
1. Com (93) 700 final: Growth, Competitiveness and Employment.
II. Green Papers
1. Com (96) 389 final: Green Paper Living and working in the Information Society:
People First. DG V/B/5 Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs. 1996
2. Com (97) 623: Green Paper on Convergence... and the implications for regulation.
Towards an information society approach: DG XIII + DG X.C. 1997.
III. Communications
1. Com (94) 347 final: Europe’s way to the information society: An Action Plan.
1994
2. COM(97) 390 Communication on the social and labour market dimension of the
information society - The next steps: July, 1997.
3. Com (95) 224: Towards the Information Society: Communication on a Methodology for the
implementation of information society applications. June 1995.
4. Com (96) 471 final. ‘Learning in the information society: Action plan for a
education initiative (1996-98) 1996.
5. Com (96) 395 final: The information society: from Corfu to Dublin. July, 1995.
6. Com (96) 592 final: Europe at the forefront of the Global Information Society:
Rolling action plan.
7. Com (97) 397: The social and labour market dimension of the information society:
People first-the next steps. 1997
8 Com (97) ICTCM19. The competitiveness of the European Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) Industries. - 14/04/97.
9. Com (98) 50: The need for strengthened International Coordination. 1998
IV. European Ministers
1. Ministerial Declaration: Global Information Networks Conference (1997)
V. Policy-reports
1. Europe and the global information society: recommendations to the European
Council. By a High Level group of (industrialist) experts: “Bangemann Report”.(25.
May 1994).
2. Making the most of the Information Society in the European Union. Information
Society Forum: June 1996 (including Working Group Reports)
3. Building the European Information society for us all. Final policy report of the
high level expert group. April 1997. For DG V.
VI. Theme Papers
1. Global Information Networks: Realising the Potential: Theme Paper: Bangemann
& Rexrodt. July 1997.
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Of these, four documents have been selected for closer analysis. These represent
different formal levels of the discussion and identifiably different perspectives. They
do not however necessarily represent the four priority-areas of the ISPO. Instead, we
have identified three major currents that we find form the recent discussion. With
their respected documents, these are:
1. The Technological Deterministic Perspective: An IT-sector policy approach:The
competitiveness of the European Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) Industries. Com (97)ICTCM19:DG
2. The Social Intergrationalist Perspective: An endogenous approach: Building the
European Information Society for us all (final report from the High Level
Expert Group) April 1997
3. The Global Challenge Perspective: A signal approach: Bonn-Ministerial
Declaration (July, 1997). Global Information Networks Conference.
4. Global Information Networks: Realising the Potential: Theme-report from
Bangemann & Rexrodt.
3.2. The Competition Communication
The first document we investigate is the 1997 Competitiveness of the ICT Industries
Communication (hereafter, the Competition Communication). It represents in many
ways the classical vein of IT-policy debate within the EU. This is to say that it is
essentially a sector-specific industrial policy framed in the urgent tone of technology-
determinism. Before looking at the specifics of the arguments of this particular item,
let us briefly survey its immediate history.
3.2.1. The Policy Context
The Competition Communication is the recent product of the Directorate General
responsible for industry (DG III). However, the heritage of this document reaches
into the heart of the European IT discussion. One link in its immediate parentage can
be traced back to the famous Bangemann-report,22 (1994), in which a "high level
expert group" presented a set of ‘concrete recommendations’ to help define Europe's
way into the Information Society. This high-level group, which was appointed by the
Commission via the impetus of the Council, consisted mainly of industrialists in the
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 Europe and the global information society: recommendations to the European Council (25.
May 1994) CD-84-94-290-C. M. Bangemann is a Commission for Industrial affairs and
Information and telecommunications technologies.
Information and communication technology in international policy debates 25
IT-sector, and it took its signals mainly from the Commission White Paper on
Growth, Competition and Employment. As the purpose of this important White Book
was explicitly "jobs, jobs, jobs", the Bangemann-report focused essentially on
stimulating competitive-potential of Europe’s IT-sector. These recommendations
were then incorporated to a greater or lesser degree into the Action-Plan, which again
we use to define (somewhat arbitrarily) the start of the ’recent IT debate’ in Europe.
What is characteristic for the Competition Communication and what binds it to the
central current of traditional EU IT policy is the following:
• The concern that the European IT-producing sector is essential to securing
European jobs, European productivity growth and ultimately European social
development in the foreseeable future;
• the assumptions that the tempo of development effecting this sector is great;
• the worry that this sector is losing ground, particularly to US competitors; and
• the view that certain costs must be accepted to transform the European IT-sector
in such a way as r to stave off foreign competition and remain at "the forefront of
the information-revolution".
The alternative to improving the performance of this industry or set of industries in a
European context is presented as a situation of following others’ leads (in the form of
conforming to standards set elsewhere: a variety of the "price-takers" situation) at the
price of European jobs. A definite sense of inevitability is involved, as is in equal
measure, the message that quick action is imperative.
A final point worth mentioning about the IT-sector-policy legacy embodied in this
recent document is that this clearly technological-deterministic vein in the European
policy discussion is a feature that is grounded in the Treaty of Rome itself. Title VI,
article 130f of the Treaty defines the aim of the Commission in matters of Research
and Technological Development to, "strengthen the scientific and technological basis
of European industry and to encourage it to become competitive at the international
level.” The importance of this inclusion should not be underestimated given the
difficulty the EU has had in defining its industrial role.23 The point is that this treaty
article has asserted a strong influence when the EU has set about "deploying"24 the
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 Which incidentally was integrated in 1987, principally in the face of the European IT-
sectors disappointing performance compared with the US. (See Andersen 1992)
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 One of bits of military jargon that emerges. (See Com (96) 607)
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Information Society, though as we will remark in our analysis, this influence has
gone from being a purely "technology push" perspective, which would be closest to
the text of this particular article, to embracing the "market-pull" orientation which we
see in the more recent documents.
3.2.2. Technological-Determinism in the Competition Communication
Basically then, we are asserting that the mainstream of the European IT-discussion
has been shaped by the combined position that aiding the IT-sector at the European
level is imperative and that it is important in order to compete amidst increasing
international competition. 25 Not surprisingly, this applies particularly to that part of
the European discussion that has been conducted in the industrially-oriented parts of
the Commission (DG III, DG XII, D XIII, more lately DG X). The Competition
Communication falls within this category, as it issues from the directorate
responsible for Industry (DG III)
Let us look next at the assumptions the Competition Communication makes about
information technology. Note first that it incorporates communication technologies
into the IT heading, yet excludes broadcasting and other content industries despite
laying emphasis on the tendency towards convergence.26 At the same time, it includes
all ‘consumer electronics’ broadly defined. The diagnosis is that EU production
industry needs active assistance lest European industry should miss this window of
opportunity and be forced to continue in a position of dependence amidst
uncontrollable unemployment. Note the advertisement style of the Communication’s
following appeal:
“Europe cannot afford to miss the boat. There are worrying signs of
• slow market growth
• declining relative shares for European producers
• uneven response to market and technological evolution ” (Competition
Communication, p 2)
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 We are drawing here inter alia on the observations of Andersen as well as the High Level
Expert Group on societal aspects of the information society. (See below)
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 Part of the reason for this exclusion seems to be that responsibility for, for ex. multimedia
lies elsewhere in the Commission (DG X)
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The Communication presents some statistics whose intent is to support this
diagnosis. However, these numbers do not support the prospects as robustly as
advertised. This is particularly the case for “slow market growth”. In Europe, market
growth for all the aggregated lot of ICT is placed at 7% p.a., which the
Communication concedes is ”an impressive figure”. The claim of ’slow market
growth’ therefore seems disingenuous. The point to make is rather that the
performance of Europeans in certain ICT-markets is considerably lower than that of
Americans (especially packaged-software) while those of other areas
(telecommunications) is superior. Though the ingredients of a somewhat more
nuanced picture of the market situation can be found spread out in the
Communication, this does not serve to sustain the desired climate of urgency within
the report.
A sense of imperative urgency does however pervade the Communication, especially
when it appeals to what can happen in the future. What will become of the EU in the
future if we fail to catch the ICT boat? What of European jobs? In addition to the
image of a single boat leaving with fortunate passengers on board, the
Communication includes other images that communicate a sense of irretrievability.
For example the image of “the future as the Information Society in all its forms takes
hold”. Repeatedly the imagery is that of something that happens to Society, brought
about by a higher power which is part technology and part global competition. Given
the situation the EU finds itself subject to, its only choice is to act through the
prescriptions supplied by the Communication.
3.2.3. Regulatory role
We note as we turn to the role that is envisioned by the Communication that the
question of why Europe must be a leading world producer of ICTs is not discussed.
Are not the real benefits of the ”information society” to be found on the users’ end?
Should one not focus on becoming leading users of these technologies whose profit
margins are always falling? Is it not here that the real benefits accrue? Some of these
questions will be raised in the next section. Here we must quickly characterise the
role it prescribes to meet the diagnosis.
The first thing to remark about how regulatory roles are envisioned in the European
discussion is that the EU adds an extra-layer to the typical delegation of roles
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between industry and national governments. Unlike Japan and unlike the US, the EU
consists of nations which continue (contrary to the fears of some and the hopes of
others) to be different than the states of the USA. This has a tendency to add a signal-
value to some of the documentation coming out of the Commission, especially in the
form of Communications.
In this Communication, the signal is sounded as follows:
“Urgent action is required by all actors (Industry, Member States, Commission) to
force the pace and ensure that European ICT industries are at the forefront of market
and technological evolution.”
The challenges include:
1. Improve market take-up
2. Transform industrial structures
3. Develop fast-growing companies
4. Enable European excellence in software
5. Optimise technology development and diffusion
6. Exploit the potential for employment growth
Certainly this is a tall order. Characteristically, however, this Communication does
not detail steps to take but instead refers to other documents or programs that are
assumed to do so. In this laundry-list style document we recognise general supply-
side ambitions, for example to ”develop fast-growing companies”. In addition, there
are general demand-side ambitions, designed to encourage a ’market-pull’ effect to
supplement the ’technology-push ’motor which remains the real focus. Improving
’market take-up’ is seen not in terms of benefiting the user, but in terms of bettering
the market prospects of (European) industry.
In addition, the Communication indicates other “New areas requiring attention”,
including ambitions to “Improve global competition; Accelerate ICT take-up and
promote awareness and; Create new markets by timely standards”.(Competition
Communication, p 10) As is suggested by the titles, most lie very close to the
‘challenges’ surveyed above, such that the question of their ’novelty’ seem to be, in
addition to their generality, spurious. Nonetheless, the Communication chooses to
conclude dramatically:
“A number of key areas for action have been identified in this Communication. The
longer their effective implementation is delayed, the more difficult it will be to hold
a leading position for the European ICT industry.”(Competition Communication, p
11)
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3.2.4. Concluding comments
It should be noted that we do not evaluate the individual merit of the key areas of
action that the Communication has chosen. No doubt there are problems that this
Communication is helpful in bringing to attention (such as the question of technical
standardization). Our critique has involved more the way this installment of the IT-
policy discussion has portrayed Information Technology and how it sees the
regulatory role.
We noted that this Communication represents the main tradition of the European
debate, a tradition rooted in the Treaty of Rome. Characteristic of this tradition is,
“the notion that technological development is autonomous of society”27 and that
society has only to submit and adapt to technology in order to ‘catch the boat’ into a
future when ‘the information society takes hold’. Here the overriding sense of
urgency is combined with rather weak statistical evidence. In other words, this is
essentially a technologically deterministic tradition, of which this Communication is
a surprisingly crude expression.
In this recent Communication a technology-push strategy is prominent, as it had been
during the 80s. Overfocusing on such an approach had been criticised, especially in
the early 1990s when recognition mounted that there was
“a need for a shift in European technology policy towards demand and the overall
conditions within which technological capabilities can be further enhanced and
developed through their increased use and the various learning feedback.”28
This Communication shows little concession to the spirit of this criticism, though a
‘market-pull’ argument is incorporated. In the next section we will see an emerging
tradition which very much distances itself from the technological determinism
tradition exemplified here.
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3.3. The Social Integrationalist Perspective: Building the European
Information Society for Us All. Final report, April 1997
3.3.1. Policy Context
This policy report, like the Bangemann-report referred to above, is the product of a
High-level Expert Group (HLEG), charged in 1995 by the Commission (DG V) to
explore the social implications of the “Information Society”. Where the Bangemann
expert-group prominently included industrialists from around Europe, this HLEG
includes a range of experts, from industry to media, from organisations representing
labour and to those representing employers. The main contingent of these experts
however was from various academic posts, including two prominent long-standing
figures in innovation studies on issues related to IT: Chris Freeman and the chairman
Luc Soete.29
In this section we will present this expert group’s argument for changing the IT
policy agenda. We argue here that they are advocating a fundamental shift in
perspective and focus for the IT policy debate, in the words of this expert group,
away “from technological determinism to social embeddedness.” To achieve such a
shift the expert group collects support from central EU and OECD documents that
stress “the social dimension” of information technology. For example the group pays
homage to the White-book on Growth, Competition, Employment, just as the
Bangemann report had, except that here it stresses this social dimension. As it does
so it formulates a thorough critique of other aspects of the European policy debate.
Particularly, it criticises the argumentation of the technological deterministic vein
that we saw running through the Competition Communication and other EU
documents.
3.3.2. Critique
Because this policy-report advocates a change in the agenda, let us focus first on this
critique. It should  however be pointed out that this critique is only incidental to the
argument of the expert-group, although the central themes  of their  “social
intergrationalist ” perspective are effectively placed into relief beside this criticism.
At the same time, this critique is important in a larger sense. It will be noted that
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European technology policy. Our presentation in this section is aided by a lecture given by L.
Soete on the topic in Maastricht, April, 1997.
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technological-determinism has long been a easy target for criticism in academic
circles. Policy-discussions as they take place in governmental settings have however
been relatively resistent to taking this comprehensive criticism into account let alone
adjusting policy measures accordingly. It is therefore important that the expert-group
has in this case introduced the criticism directly into the mainstream of the European
policy debate, illustrating how such a perspective has not only proved ineffective in
terms of expressed policy goals but, indeed counterproductive.
The high level group’s critiqueis framed first and foremost in practical terms. It first
indicates that the policy of IT-industry support which has been in place since the 80s
has been a failure in its own terms:
“Despite a succession of long-term research support policies during the 1980’s, European
competitiveness in these ICT related areas deteriorated often in those areas most strongly
supported by European research and development policies.” (Information Society Report,
p 13)
Second, the expert-group argues that the predominance that technological
determinism enjoys in much of the policy debate in Europe has served to isolate this
debate and limit the scope for policy action. Indeed, it identifies the policy language
connected to this limiting perspective as in part responsible for “lack of public
support for the information society.” We remember from the Competition
Communication (under “take-up”) that exactly this type of support was noted as a
policy objective. The expert group therefore points out that not only does such a
perspective not achieve what it sets out to do, it counteracts its own expressed
objectives. It is interesting to note that this expert-group sees its revelation of this
central paradox in the IT-debate as its “main contribution”. (Information Society Report,
p 18)
3.3.3. Constructive vision
The expert-group’s contribution is however by no means limited to a critique of the
existing debate. It defines its own goals in the following way:
“Our group must illustrate that there are numerous social policy challenges
associated with a future European information society, stress that these transcend the
simplistic notions of rapid adjustment to a future determined by the ‘external’ force
of technological change in which people have no influence and no chance to
participate, and highlight the countless opportunities for engineering a European
information society for us all.” (Information Society Report, 19)
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Let us start our survey of the high level group’s “social integrationalist vision” and
the challenges it identifies by indicating what its alternative to the technological
deterministic perspective is. The ‘vision’ insists on understanding technology as
being socially-embedded. This perspective is here illustrated with reference to OECD
Sundqvist report in the following way:
“It puts the emphasis on technology as a social process which, ‘by meeting real or
imagined needs changes those needs just as it is changed by them. Society, in this
view, is shaped by technical change, and technical change is shaped by society.”
(Information Society Report, p17)
The focus of this endogenous view of technology indeed seems to lie in the very idea
of the “information society”, yet it tends to be sequestered away in theoretical reports
and overlooked by the general discussion. One of the merits of this report is that it
provocatively spells out certain implications of this view for information
technologies. One of this expert-group’s points of departure is the commonly used
simile, which in the Communication on “Europe’s way to the Information Society:
An action plan” is framed in this way:
“A ‘digital revolution’ is triggering structural changes comparable to last century’s
industrial revolution with the corresponding high economic stakes. The process
cannot be stopped and will lead eventually to a knowledge-based economy.”
(Information Society Report, p 1)
The expert group indicates that in fact there are fundamental differences between the
growth associated with other highly visible technology clusters such as the railway
and the car, and the present ‘evolution’. The key point involves what
“complementary asset” the technology-set needs to develop. In the case of the
railway, knock-on investments to intermediate goods (for ex. steel and machinery) in
turn prompted an upsurge in demand for these physical goods, which contributed to
overall growth in the economy. In contrast, there is very little knock-on benefit in
terms of increased intermediate demand for “physical, material goods and capital
equipment” for information technologies. The key complementary asset simply does
not reside in intermediate goods (e.g. plastics for building computers, iron oxide for
semiconductors). As the expert-group observes,
“despite the major capital investment required for some of these products (e.g.
semiconductors) material, physical capital accumulation is no longer the essential
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‘complementary asset’ of these sets of new technologies. Rather since the
knowledge on how to use information typically depends on individual skills and …
‘tacit’ knowledge, the new complementary asset to the growth and use of new ICTs
is investment in intangible, human capital.” (Information Society Report,  p 17)
It is therefore not only important that Europeans are not alienated by the idea of an
information society, it is essential that they are integrated into it and develop the
skills to interact within it. Their role is much larger than that of a one-time consumer.
Another point that gets lost amidst the rhetoric of an information society or even a
‘knowledge based economy’ is that there are huge differences between data and
information, information and knowledge, knowledge and wisdom. The point about
the economic behaviour of information which is fundamentally different to that of
capital goods, is that whereas the economics of the latter is concerned with solving
problems of scarcity, the economics of the latter introduces problems of
overabundance (i.e. of information). Managing this overabundance requires
knowledge, which again places a premium on the complementary asset inherent in
the skills of users. The expert-group pulls the jargon surrounding the information
society into focus by observing that the ultimate goal should not be an information
society, nor yet a knowledge-based society but alas a ‘wise society’. The point is that
one has the opportunity to choose the type of society one wants from a multitude of
‘information societies’; it is not a one-off question of catching the boat like a refugee.
3.3.4. Policy challenges
The expert group argues that the question of the information society is at base a
question of a ‘learning society’. Given that the complementary asset for ICT is not
physical goods, and that value creation in ICT involves the development of human
capital on the demand side, the group focuses on investing in this capital. Here it
identifies a major problem and perhaps the greatest challenge facing policy-makers.
The problem is that the incentive to invest in learning in order to create this capital is
negative. Three reasons for this are mentioned.
♦ The first is demographic. Comparing the rate of knowledge turnover in the ICT
field and that of employment turnover in Europe, one finds that there is a great
discrepancy. The workforce in Europe is old, employment turnover is about 2%,
which means that relying on next generations to keep up with the new knowledge
will take time.
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♦ The second involves the dynamics of today’s labor-markets. The fact that
employees remain in the same job for shorter periods of time means that there is
little incentive for firms to invest in human-capital in the present generation of
the workforce.
♦ Upgrading skills is then left up to the public educational system. There are
barriers to investment in education because of budgetary-constraints (especially
EMU criteria) that effectively disallow increased investment into education.
A key implication is the need to consider how to stimulate knowledge creation and
the acquisition of skills. Here there is a role for policy makers. But what are the
choices? The expert-group makes several suggestions. Three central policy proposals
were proposed to the Commission:
The first is to use public service as an engine for growth. The idea is that the public
sector should not, as it has in the past, try to push Europe into the Information Age.
The expert-group makes clear that Europe has not been able to capitalise on
elasticities generated by ICT by promoting production of ICT equipment. They
suggest another approach. The group recommends that governments should try to
influence the demand of ICT services by actively promoting an array of public
services at all levels on the net: these include information services, tax
information/services, census, car-registration etc.30 These public services would
become the ‘killer applications’ that would both create demand (plus generate spin-
offs) and get people actively interested in ICT. It would also generate knowledge
production.
A second recommendation introduces the idea of University/College Degree with a
maintenance contract. The suggestion involves follow-up courses by which one’s
degree would be updated say every three years. Universities would be made
responsible not only for the granting of a degree. After three years the graduate
would return for a course to update one’s theoretical knowledge and/or skills.
A third recommendation which has since been blacklisted is the ’Bit-tax’ idea. The
bit tax is intended to address the problem of budgetary constraints. The premise is
that the tax-base is shifting, and that production/ distribution/ consumption are
becoming increasing indivisible and untaxable as a function of the Information
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 It is interesting that on his recent visit to Sweden, Bill Gates wondered why Scandanavian
governments were not better at promoting exactly this sort of service.
Information and communication technology in international policy debates 35
Economy. A ‘bit tax’ would be levied on the transmission of information by volume
and this revenue would be plowed into the educational system. This particular
policy-recommendation however was dropped from the agenda of the final report
amidst tremendous popular and political pressure. The Commission is careful to note
that the idea of taxing the net is not on its agenda.
3.3.5. Concluding comments
Again, without taking a position on the individual recommendations, we look at the
way this document analyses technology and promotes the role of the regulatory
agency. We have reviewed these issues fairly closely above. We observed first that
this policy report is unique within the European IT-discussion; it explicitly criticizes
the current of technology determinism flowing through it and identifies that the
dominant deterministic perspective as a major problem. Further, we observed how
this document takes seriously the relationship between society and technology, how
it analyses the economic and social dimensions at stake and how it identifies policy
challenges that have thus far been downplayed or overlooked by the current
discussion. Finally, we surveyed several of this document’s policy recommendations.
On this basis we reach the conclusion that this is the most interesting and fprward-
looking of the documents we have surveyed.
3.4. Globalisation: Global Information Networks
3.4.1. The Policy Context
In this last section on the EU, we survey a third perspective which is characteristic of
the recent IT-discussion in Europe. This perspective attempts to take the focus which
Bangemann et al. directed at the European-dimension (Europe’s Way into the
Information Society) and raise it onto a ‘global’ plane. We examine two related
documents in this globalization context.
• Global Information Networks - Realising the potential. Theme-paper. The Bonn-
Conference, July 1997. Bangemann & Rexrodt;
• Ministerial Declaration: Global Information Networks. July, 1997
The first is a policy-report which is unlike the ones we have thus far seen in that it
was not formally instigated, neither by the Commission nor a member state
government. Instead it is a position paper forwarded and signed by two individuals,
36 STEP report R-14/1998
36
M. Bangemann (Commission) and G. Rexrodt (Federal Minister of Economics,
Germany), after having received comments from  participant countries in advance of
the conference. This document formed the centrepiece of the conference of the same
name that took place in 1997. This document apparently set the agenda for the
conference and exerted a strong influence over its conclusions. The second document
is a formal document that represents the common-declaration of European ministers
on the subject of Global Information Networks. In addition to this Bonn-Conference,
other documents indicating a certain shift in this direction include the G-7 Core
Principles paper and Com (98) 50 DG XIII: The need for Strengthened International
Coordination. 31
The Bangemann/Rexrodt theme paper continues in the spirit of the Bangemann-
report from 1994 in that it is mostly concerned with setting a common regulatory
framework in order to promote the development of markets for IT-based services.
The introduction emphasises especially multimedia in terms of creating new
employment and electronic commerce, and because “it will also have a considerable
impact on Europe’s competitiveness on world markets.” (Theme Paper, p. 1) In
certain passages it is as if the promise of the Information Society has already been
delivered:
“The rapid and coherent development of the Information Society has become
essential to nations’ competitiveness, employment and living standards. (Yet)
Europe must realise the full potential” (Theme Paper, p 1. Emphasis added)
However, the focus of this Bangemann-report is to seize new opportunities. Where
the Bangemann report from 1994 argued for Tele-liberalisation, he and Rexrodt
argue that we are now in a post liberalised market, characterised by a shift “from
infrastructure to the creation and transmission of content as well as to the
development of value-added services.” (Theme Paper, p 3) On one level, it should be
noted, they are still arguing for infrastructure, if the regulatory frameworks
connected to Intellectual Property Rights and other standards and norms for domain
names (DNS) or operation connected to e-commerce can be called infrastructure. Be
that as it may, the argument is, as in 1994, about “enabling the market” especially by
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 Note associated governments of Europe, as well as countries of central and eastern Europe
are also represented.
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ensuring that the technical interconnection of networks are not derailed by the
unwillingness to find common rules of the road, now at the global level. Objectives
here involve "Creating a favourable environment for electronic commerce", or
"Making the most of content-resources".
Although much of the discussion is still about enabling cross-border flows of data, a
certain degree of the Social-Intergrationalist vision is incorporated into this
document. The Bangemann/Rexrodt paper highlights “building confidence” among
society in a tone that is much user-friendlier than the Competition Communication
we looked at above. The view of the societal side of technology remains however
essentially pragmatic and involves making society feel less threatened by questions
of data-theft, security or confidentiality. Further, a section is dedicated to
“empowering the user” in which issues connected to education and equality are
raised. In a section entitled “enabling participation by all”, there is clear reference to
the expert-group behind the Information Society Report reviewed above, though the
issues of user-friendliness and improved education (here called ‘digital literacy’) are
not seen as fundamental questions but something to be fixed by certain adjustments.
No new role for the regulatory is foreseen on this front. On the question of the
regulatory role, this document, “aims to concentrate attention on those areas where
the development of the Global Information Networks might benefit from
constructive and enlightened use of the powers of government. It aims to give due
weight to the legitimate interests of industry and of users” (emphasis added).
The Ministerial Declaration, a highly political document, gives prominence to the
idea of “An Opportunity for All”. Like the Bangemann-Rexrodt report, it endorses
the idea of “empowering the user” and seeks to “stimulate developments in the
educational system and in professional training systems so that information… is
exploited as part of the learning process at all levels, from primary to post-graduate,
as well as for lifelong learning.” (p. 7) This might raise hopes that the regulatory
level had started to adopt a more ‘social-Intergrationalist’ perspective. However,
there is more ample support to the contrary: namely that the Council of Ministers
continues to cling to the technological deterministic position. Indeed, the question of
education is not among the roles these representatives of government see for
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government. The role they define for themselves in this document involves a
traditional mix of ‘providing the framework’ and ‘stimulating new services’.
In their view of technology, the language is likewise reminiscent of the ‘catching the
boat’ urgency we met above. Indicative of this current is the statement that the
Ministers, “consider that opportunities offered by Global Information Networks must
be seized most energetically and speedily in order to reap the benefits in terms of
competitiveness, growth and employment.” (p. 1) We note the resemblance of the
title of the White Paper from 1993 on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment,
and remark that the only visible change seems to be the promotion of the position of
“competitiveness”.
3.5. Characteristics of the EU-discussion
We have surveyed the recent IT-discussion of information technology in Europe
through a number of key documents associated with the EU. In the section above, we
examined 4 key documents that serve to illustrate three major perspectives
dominating this discussion. These were the “Technological Determinism” position,
the “Social Intergrationalist” position and the “Globalising-Networks” position. In
our work it became clear that the first position represents the original position of the
Commission on matters concerning  information technology. We have tried to
emphasise how this postion has expressed itself in mainly demand-side industrial-
policy measures, which until recently have been deaf to supply-side measures. The
way technology is perceived is important in that it influences the way markets are
conceived and thus how recommendations are framed. This position underplays the
role of society in the information society it itself advocates, limits its own role and
arguably overlooks the key challenges.
Though it has been thoroughly criticised in the theoretical literature, the position we
have seen allied to technology-push sector policies seems to perpetuate itself. The
spirit remains very much alive in the Globalising-Networks position. However, in
focusing on perpetuating information and communication technologies into the rest
of the world, the perspective moves towards promoting conditions that will stimulate
use of services.  Particularly, the policy discussion promotes electronic commerce
and the vaguely defined area of multimedia, in the latter case particularly linking
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increased access and use to increased European employment. In this sense, there is a
move towards a more supply-side orientation. In this sense, the policy discussion
seems to have paid heed to the criticism  noted above that there was a need to shift,
“towards demand and the overall conditions within which technological capabilities
can be further enhanced.” (Freeman & Soete. 1991: cited above) Despite the drift in
this direction, however, the focus here seems to be more on creating external markets
for European products and less on creating an dynamic interaction in Europe through
which technological capabilities might develop according to learning feedbacks.
Such concerns are addressed in the last position we considered, that advocating a
Social Intergrationalist perspective. The Building the European Information Society
for us all report which puts forward this position is far and away the most interesting
document in the European and arguably the IT-discussion at large. This perspective
goes explores the worn idea of the Information Society in order to spell out what a
serious treatment of the relationship between technology and society might entail.
Further, it takes the IT-discussion beyond widespread metaphors of IT as the ‘Third
Industrial Revolution’ in its analysis characteristics of IT and their implications on
policy.
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Chapter 4: The US information and communication technology
policy debate
We’re headed into the "digital age" of high-speed networks and information on
demand. Multimedia, microchips, and megabits will change how we live, learn,
work, and play. But despite all the press coverage, the public debate has yet to offer
the context or perspective we need to understand what’s at stake and how we can
build these new tools in the public interest. The networks of the digital age will take
their shape from the institutions that build them. But they will also be defined by the
users who make demands on them. By the policymakers that set the rules for them.
And by the citizens who see what’s at stake -- and act on it.32
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter we deal with the US debate on information- and communication
technology. As in the analysis of Norwegian and the European policy debate, we will
try to answer two main questions: We first ask: Is the policy debate marked by a
concern with perceived and projected consequences, but with a lack of interest in, or
willingness to discuss more fundamental questions concerning the mechanisms that
generate new technology and the selection processes which decide between
technological alternatives and development directions? Is progress taken for granted,
and changes implicitly (or explicitly) assumed to be necessary and/or predetermined,
and to be something else than a product of social actions among members of society;
a result of impersonal powers such as market forces, or as a result of a development
logic built into science itself? To what extent do arguments reflect an understanding
of the fact that technology development is a human and social product and an
expression of political will and strategies? Secondly, we ask to what extent the
debate reflects that policy makers (and others having a voice in the US information-
and communication technology policy debate) rely on the so-called linear model in
their thinking about science, technology and society. Post-World War II policy
rhetoric has tended to assume and imply a one-way sequential development path
from basic scientific research to commercial applications of technology. In contrast
to this image, modern studies of science, technology and society show that
innovation happens in a social context: Innovation presupposes that agents take part
in an interactive process. Although there are significant functional distinctions to be
made between scientists and employees in commercial firms, there are important
complementarities and reciprocities which are crucial for the success of the activities
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both in science, applied technology and in commercial business. To what extent does
the US policy discussion incorporate an adequate understanding of such issues?
Developing the argument, we have been fortunate to be able to draw on earlier
analytical work.33 However, we have first and foremost based our analysis on
primary sources, of which a considerable amount is available on the Internet.
4.2. Overview
There is a striking paradox in the post war attitude to science, technology and
commercial activities in the US. One the one hand, liberal economic ideas have had
great influence, and the legitimacy of state involvement in the economy has been
very limited. There has been room for a science policy, but very little room for a
technology policy: The ruling ideology being that science is (or should be) a pure,
spiritual activity, kept securely apart from business and the impure realm of mammon
(with technology being the bridge between them), the legitimate role of Government
had to be to support basic science in all its forms, but not to interfere with
commercial exploitation of the scientific end-products. On the other hand, there is
absolutely no doubt that the US leadership in information- and communication
technology has been created in an interplay between private and public institutions.
To a large extent, key developments were pushed ahead in a collaborative effort
under the umbrella of the Cold War, legitimised by national security needs. Thus,
there has been an effective technology policy – but carried out mainly in a military
and security policy context.34
After some scattered technology policy initiatives during the 1980s, there appears to
have occurred a significant shift in policy making as the Cold War petered out. In
1990 president Bush presented the first draft of an overall US Technology Policy.
The Congress passed the High Performance Computing Act, which launched the
High Performance Computing and Communications Initiative (HPCCII). And as
Clinton entered the White House in January 1993, an already active technology
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 What’s at stake? The Benton Foundation 1996. (http://www.benton.org/library/stake/ brief.html)
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 For example Anders Hellebust: Utvikling av informasjonssamfunn: visjoner, politikk og reell
utvikling i USA, Japan og EU. Rapport 34/97. Oslo: Telenor FoU.
34
 Among the first to point out this Janus face in US post-war economic history was Merrit Roe Smith
– see Roe Smith (ed.) 1985.
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policy debate was institutionalised on the highest level of the executive branch of US
government, and focus was turned even more decisively towards information- and
communication technology issues.
To be ease orientation in the debate during the following years, we have drawn up a
sketch of the American policy system in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Key institutions in the US information- and communication technology
policy system
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The American policy system is large and complex, and the IT policy discussion has
been  similarly extensive and multifaceted. Box 4.1 lists a number of the central
written contributions to the debate, some of the legislation initiatives, and some of
the new institutions that have been created. In the ensuing text we present some of
the stakeholders in the debate, and we make an effort synthesise main lines of
argument presented in certain of the most interesting documents.
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Box 4.1: Some reference points in the US information- and communication
technology policy landscape
POLICY DOCUMENTS
• Technology: The engine of economic growth. A National Technology Policy for America.
Clinton/Gore Campaign Document (1992).
• Technology for America’s economic growth. A new direction to build economic strength. White
House Press Release  (1993). (http://library.white-house.gov)
• The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for action. (1993)
• Realising the Information Future. The internet and beyond. Computer Science and Telecommuni-
cations Board, National Research Council (1994).
• The national information infrastructure: A revolution for the millennium. Dr. A. Prabhakar, di-
rector of the National Institute of Standards and Technology: Remarks (1995).
http://www.nist.gov/speeches/oct95/mayo.htm
• The NII – An Administrative Perspective. Michael Nelson, White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy. Speech at the Workshop on Advanced Digital Video in the National Infor-
mation Infrastructure. (http://www.eeel.nist.gov/advnii/nelson.htm)
• A framework for global electronic commerce. William Clinton & Albert Gore Jr. (1997)
(http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm)
• ”Opportunities for optimism.” Larry Irving35. Remarks at the 15th Annual FCBA/PLI36 confer-
ence on telecommunications policy and regulations (1997). http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
speeches/121297pli.htm
• The emerging digital economy. Lynn Margherio et. al. U.S. Department of Commerce, Secretar-
iat on Electronic Commerce (1998) (http://www.ecommerce.gov)
• Next Generation Internet. Implementation plan. National Coordination Office for Computing,
Information and Communications (1998) (http://www.ccic.gov)
• Past and prologue: Why I am optimistic about the future. Remarks by congressman George E.
Brown, Jr. at the American Association for the Advancement of Science’s Colloquium on Science
and Technology Policy, Washington DC (1998).
INITIATIVES, TASK FORCES AND PROGRAMMES
• High Performance Computing and Communications Initiative (1990)
• National Information Infrastructure (1993)
• The Information Infrastructure Taskforce (1993-1996)
• Global Information Infrastructure
• Next Generation Internet Initiative (1996)
LEGISLATION
• The Telecommunications Act (1996)
• The High Performance Computing Act (1991)
• The Internet Tax Freedom Act
• The Electronic Commerce Enhancement Act
• The Digital Signature and Electronic Authentication Law
• The Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act
• The Next Generation Internet Act
• Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act
MONOGRAPHS
• Bill Gates: The road ahead (1995)
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 Larry Irving is Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of
Commerce. He also chairs the committee on Telecommunications Policy under the Information
Infrastructure Task Force. (Data from July 1996.) Confer: http://www.iitf.nist.gov/committee.html
36
 Federal Communications Bar Association and the Practicing Law Institute.
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4.3. The information- and communication technology  industry
In spite of the active US Government approach during the 1990s, there is no doubt
that the main driving force in the development towards information society (or the
digital economy – or whatever other term is used to depict a society in which digital
electronics technologies have been widely diffused) is the information- and
communication technology industry itself. This is an important industry in the US:
♦ It generated 6,2 percent of the US gross national product in 1996, growing from
5,4 percent i 1990, and was the biggest US industry measured in revenues as well
as in number of employees.
♦ Turnover grew almost 60 percent between 1990 and 1996. Within software and
some other segments the growth rates where approximately the double of this.
Revenues in the communications services grew 43 percent, from 187 billion
dollars to 267 billion between 1990 and 1996.
♦ Communications services industry employment has grown steadily since 1993
and reached 1.1 million in 1996. The software and computer-related services
industry created more than 450.000 new jobs between 1990 and 1996, a 58
percent jump form 780.000 to 1.2 million.
♦ The information- and communication technology industry was also leading as
investors in R&D, and it was the leading export industry, selling for about 150
billion US dollars abroad in 1996. American information- and communication
technology industry was also leading in terms of investments abroad.37
The industry has many leaders and advocates which are highly visible and respected
citizens. It is clearly not surprising that these people are the most technology
optimistic among the knowledgeable people having a voice in the information and
communication technology policy debate. Considering their active role in creating
and promoting new technology, it might be a bit more surprising that the industry
leaders also appear to be the only participants in the debate that voice arguments that
it would appear reasonable to label as technology deterministic. In Microsoft boss
Bill Gates’ book The road ahead from 199538 we can read that:
One thing is clear: We don’t have the option of turning away from the future. No one
gets to vote on whether technology is going to change our lives. No one can stop
productive change in the long run because the marketplace inexorably embraces it.
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 The numbers are from ”Opportunities for optimism.” Remarks by Larry Irving to the 15th Annual
FCBA/PLI conference on telecommunications policy and regulations
(http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/speeches/121297pli.htm) and from Newsletter 14/98 from Tore Li,
Science Counsel at the Norwegian Embassy in Washington.
38
 The original edition of this book held the top position on the New York Times Best-seller List for
seven weeks in 1995 and was published in more than twenty languages. The book was widely
reviewed, in newspapers, as well as in the large number of specialised information- and
communication technology publications.
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… I believe that because progress will come no matter what, we need to make the
best of it – not to try to forestall it.39
What does this type of  determinism consist in? Crudely speaking, mainly in two
things, we believe:
First, that Gates knows from the inside the strong momentum that there is in the
information and communication technology business itself, and that he is a true
believer in the efficacy and efficiency of the products that his firm – and the industry
in general – is creating. In effect, he is convinced that all rational individuals and
firms will want to use the new information and communication technology tools that
are becoming available, and thus, it is unimaginable that any conservative force can
be strong enough stop the development towards a digital economy and information
society.
Second, Gates obviously is aware of the fact that it is in his and his company’s
interest that everyone believes in the “inexorability” of the diffusion of digital
technologies. His description is as much a prescription as it is a prognosis. The kind
of determinism we find in his argumentation may very well be a clever marketing
effort – an attempt to make what Merton called the self-fulfilling prophecy.
The fundamental premise in Gates’ book is that the marriage of computing and
telecommunications, of computers and the Internet, will revolutionise social life and
transform modern economies. And they will do so, he claims, because they are
superior tools – superior in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. However, there is a
telling truism underlying the reasoning: “Superior technologies win in the
marketplace, and they way to know they are superior is to see that they win in the
marketplace.”
In reality, very few knowledgeable people today believe that it is possible to find
objective technical measures to rate qualitatively different technologies as superior or
inferior. And even if such measures in some cases can be agreed upon, there is
certainly no guarantee that technical superiority would make a technology win in the
marketplace. Hence, although the US debate seems to convey a consensus that the
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development towards information technology has a fundamental and sound techno-
economic rationale, it is quite possible that many tacitly share the understanding that
this is a justification, and not the reason for the development. Although there might
be a valid techno-economic rationale for the development of information society, the
eventual success of this development will be the result of conscientious efforts and
intense struggles, and it is far from the result of simple human rationality and a built-
in logic of history. As Gates himself displays an acute awareness of, this success
would rely not least on the ability to influence people’s minds about what is
happening and what should be happening.
In reality, the information and communication technology industry is both following
popular sentiment (to the extent that consumers and businesses chooses whether to
buy a product or not), and at the same time leading the way, working hard to shape
ideas and habits in the daily life of people. (Gates’ book is an expression of exactly
this type of effort.) That microelectronics is a generic technology which can be put to
beneficial use in business and in most people’s daily life is no longer a vision only in
the minds of engineers. We are all confronted with the potential of microelectronics
and information- and communication technologies. We have adopted cellular phones,
computers are diffusing into homes and schools, and software games are crowding
out television (and more) from our everyday lives. We can actually see from one
product generation to the next how the size of electronic devices is shrinking, and
how their capabilities are becoming ever stronger. Thus, even if it might well be that
information- and communication technology as such is hyped – that it is less
important in economic terms and less revolutionary in social and cultural terms than
industry pundits claim, there can be little doubt that popular opinion has accepted the
notion of a digital revolution, and the notion that modern societies are transforming
into information societies or post-industrial societies. In other words: The cost-
saving effects of the new technology might be unclear, and the cultural benefit in
moving into digital media might be doubtful, but popular opinion has endorsed the
concept of a revolution. And here the so-called Thomas Theorem applies to the full:
If a social phenomenon is accepted as real – then it is real in its consequences.
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4.4. The US congress40
The most significant change in information and communication technology
legislation during the 1990s is no doubt the radical changes in the rules and
regulations for telecommunications. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 law was
designed to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework.
While earlier regulation accepted local telecommunications monopolies, but reduced
the power of network operators to make monopoly profits, the new legislation aimed
at opening up the whole telecommunication market for competition. In order to
accelerate private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and
information technologies telecommunications markets were opened to competition.
The idea was that with the new information and communication technologies taking
shape, private interests would find it appealing to make huge investments in
developing large scale, high capacity networks.
There appears to be a very broad consensus that new technologies are making
deregulation unavoidable. Existing telecommunication regulations were developed
basically for standard telephone equipment. New digital technologies changes
completely the subject matter of the legislation. Existing telecommunication
monopolies tended to limit innovation by (1) imposing high prices on leased lines
and on local exchange services used by online service providers, by (2) obstructing
interconnection between networks, blaming “incompatibilities” or “absence of need
for other provider”, by (3) limiting users possibility to attach devices to networks,
and finally by (4) claiming that internet traffic is comparable to broadcasting, and
should be subjected to the same type of legislation and regulation as is broadcasting.
In the framework of the World Trade Organisation, an agreement was concluded that
will (1) promote privatisation of government controlled telecommunication
companies, (2) promote and preserve competition in telecommunications markets,
ensuring interconnection at fair prices, opening markets to foreign investment, and
enforcing anti-trust safeguards, (3) guaranteeing open access to networks on a non-
discriminatory basis, and (4) implementing, by an independent regulator, pro-
competitive and flexible regulation that keeps pace with technological development.
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In line with this, the Telecommunications Act, as well as additional bills, resolutions
and comments from the 104th and 105th congresses (1996-1998) that we have
screened, seem to indicate that the politicians in the congress substantially aim at
facilitating the efforts of private business enterprises to develop the “emerging digital
economy”. Judging from the political rhetoric the key issues as perceived by the
politicians appear to be:
• Threats to privacy
• Security issues
• Harmful or inappropriate content
• Uneven access to information – increased social differences between the haves
and the have-nots
• Intellectual property rights
• Human resources – lack of competent people in the growing industry, and in
addition far-reaching de-skilling and possible unemployment in other industries
(not least due to an expected strong growth in electronic commerce)
• A long range of technical issues related to the effective functioning of the
national (and increasingly global) information infrastructure
There is currently a significant effort being done to build a regulatory framework
promoting the unfettered growth of electronic commerce. Among acts and bills
currently in the legislative process are the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the Electronic
Commerce Enhancement Act, the Digital Signature and Electronic Authentication
Law, the Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act and the Next Generation
Internet Act. 41
The legislative efforts reflect that politicians on Capitol Hill share the conviction of
the information and communication technology industry leaders that there is a very
strong rationale for the development of the digital economy, and that it is an
important responsibility for legislators to make sure the efforts of businesses are not
done in vain. Judging from testimonies and from text in bills, declarations and laws,
this has very little if anything to do with “technological determinism”. The legislators
seem to be well aware that new electronics technologies are being actively developed
in a constellation of organisations from business, government and academia that
shared a strong interest in the success of these technologies. Furthermore, legislators
are technology optimists, at least in the limited sense that they think it is important
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that the information- and communication technology industry continues to grow, to
create new jobs and to secure continued US technological leadership. Although it is
hard to judge what is real convictions behind the declarations of the public
statements, it also appears that many Congressmen are technology optimists in a
deeper sense. Many appear to believe in the positive potential of information society
– in what it can bring of individual empowerment and enrichment of culture and
social life.
4.5. The White House and the Clinton Administration
Under Clinton, the whole administration, and in particular the office of the Vice
President, has paid a lot of attention to the significance of information and
communication technologies and related public policies. Clinton from the outset of
his campaign argued that Government has a specifically significant role to play, since
the development of information- and communication technology is a systems
building effort, where the development of infrastructure, standards etc. is crucial.
After entering office, Clinton actively has used the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OTP) to formulate policies which promote and modulate the development of
information and communication technologies. OTP’s explicit mission is to work with
the private sector to develop and advocate national policies that maximise
technology’s contribution to US economic growth, the creation of high-wage jobs,
and improvements in the quality of life.
This reflects one of the central policy concerns of the Clinton administration, namely
the potentially negative effects of the end of the Cold War on the dynamism and the
coherence of the US innovation system. A key document where this concern is
voiced is the White House Press Release Technology for America’s economic growth
from 1993.42 In this document President Clinton and Vice President Gore argued that
closer interaction ought to be established between federal and state institutions and
business firms, in order to foster the development new products, compatible with the
social and economic needs that were emerging after the dawn of the cold war. They
use an explicit systems-rationale in order to argue the need for public policy
engagement in the process that one believes and wishes will take place: From the 19th
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century Government had to invest in and regulate railroad infrastructure
development. Invest, because of the enormous costs and because of the long-term
perspective for gaining profit from such investments. Regulate, because private
initiative led to a plethora of systems characteristics which made systems
incompatibilities the rule and not the exception. Today, Government is needed to
help building the information infrastructure for the new era. Especially in the open
and competitive framework of the new telecommunications legislation, Government
and private business have to work together in an interactive process in order to
realise the promises of the emerging information society, and in order for the
industry and the infrastructure not to become fragmented into a host of incompatible
products, technologies and networks. Government has a dual obligation:
• First, to strive to develop regulations and standards compatible with the rapid
expansion of the new technology.
• Second, to join forces with private industry to add momentum and influence the
direction of the developments already under way.
During the Cold War a significant part of the crucial interaction (between industrial
interests, scientific research and government institutions) took place within a
military-industrial set-up where the Pentagon and military interests ruled and the
general fundament for legitimacy was national security needs.43 Clinton and Gore
argued the need to extend this kind of cooperation, and to bring it out of the military
sphere and into the core of the civilian economy and to the heart of policy making
aiming at satisfying the needs of the American people.
Drawing up this kind of perspective, Clinton and Gore found that information- and
communication technology takes on an added significance. This is the crucial
enabling technology which facilitates in a new and radical way systems building on
the innovation process level. Modern information- and communication technology
binds actors together across institutional and geographical boundaries. Thus,
information and communication technology can come to make up for the loss of  the
institutional integration that had been such a pregnant side effect of the Cold War
effort.
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Assistant Secretary Larry Irving of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration of the US Department of Commerce touched upon this
effect of information and communication technology in a speech held December 12,
1997:
“… [The new] advanced technologies … are about people – how to harness
… technologies and use them to communicate better with family, colleagues,
and business partners; to revitalise our communities; to improve our chil-
dren’s education; and to enhance the way we receive medical services. These
technologies are powerful and empowering. … It all comes down to this:
connecting communities, uniting people.”44
Clearly, the Clinton administration has not sidestepped the opportunity to make
grand claims about the social and economic significance of information- and
communication technology. Mr. Arati Prabhakar, president of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, in a speech he held October 4, 1995 argued that the
proposed National Information Infrastructure would be “the Revolution of the
Millennium”.45 Also, in the document A framework for global electronic commerce
Clinton and Gore stated that
“We are on the verge of a revolution that is just as profound as the change in
the economy that came with the industrial revolution. Soon electronic net-
works will allow people to transcend the barriers of time and distance and
take advantage of global markets and business opportunities not even imagin-
able today, opening up a new world of economic possibility and progress.
….
Internet has emerged as an appliance of every day life, accessible from almost
every point on the planet. Students across the world are discovering vast
treasure troves of data via the World Wide Web. Doctors are utilising tele-
medicine to administer off-site diagnoses to patients in need. Citizens of
many nations are finding additional outlets for personal and political expres-
sion. The Internet is being used to reinvent government and reshape our lives
and our communities in the process.”46
These quotes echo in a remarkable way the enthusiastic claims made by Microsoft’s
Bill Gates two years earlier (in his 1995 book).
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4.6. IT policy debate on the level of individual states
One of the key issues the Clinton administration has had to face is extensive criticism
of government inefficiencies and opposition to reintroducing the state bureaucracy as
an active partner in business operations. Clinton has had to emphasise that
Government is supposed first and foremost to function as a catalyst, and not as a
stakeholder in business as such. Clinton has been tactically smart, however, in
coupling up his wish for active government in the development of information and
communication technology, with initiatives to develop revolutionary applications
aiming exactly at improving the everyday running of government affairs. Clinton has
argued that information and communication technology is pertinent in order to
succeed in his widely publicised effort to Reinvent Government.
According to a recent OECD study,47 the IT policy debate at the state level in the US
has reflected this approach to policy on the federal level. It has to a large extent been
focusing on internal aspects of the state government. There have been growing
demands for improved organisational performance, higher levels of accountability,
and for local government to take advantage of the changes happening in information
management and communication technology to create more effective management of
information resources and through this to create improved state welfare.
Among key issues that have been debated are the following:
♦ Co-ordination of information resources management among and between
agencies, planning and budgeting relationships and inter-system communication,
in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of local government.
♦ Strengthening the role of state governments as policymakers for science- and
technology in general.
♦ State governments acting as change agents; encouraging innovation and building
public/private co-operative partnerships in science, education and industry, in
order – for example – to promote development of advanced manufacturing
technologies, geographic information systems etc.
♦ Development of state level legislation for information access as well as
concomitant legislation concerning privacy, data security and computer crime.
As the federal government has used deregulation as a means to reduce bureaucratic
inefficiencies and to increase market competition, also state level involvement in
regulatory reform has increased and local governments have taken a more proactive
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role with respect to strategic, state-wide planning. State level public policies for
information- and communication technology is a sign of a general realignment of
government’s roles and responsibilities which has happened over the last years, and
which has given government a bigger say in service delivery, regulation enforcement
and policy formulation.48
4.7. Conclusion
As we have seen, people from the Clinton administration has been as up-beat about
the impact of information technology on the economy, on government and on social
life in general as has the representatives of the industry themselves. Some work has
been done on documenting the rapid growth of the information and communication
technology industry. But, in spite of many attempts, it has not been possible to prove
with statistics that information and communication technology actually is bringing
productivity gains to business.49 Furthermore, we have not found any real analysis
substantiating the many grand claims about the wonders of a future information
society. The ideological claims about the empowering and democracy enhancing
effects of the diffusion of information- and communication technology appears to be
no more than hopeful expectations. Many important questions remain unanswered:
♦ Will a development towards electronic communication and electronic trade create
more workplaces that it will eradicate?
♦ Will the use of electronic communication tools really pull people closer together?
To use Durkheimian concepts, will such technologies increase integration and
decrease anomie, or is it the other way around?
♦ Will information- and communication technology increase the freedom of
individuals, or will it in reality increase the possibility to control individual
behaviour?
♦ Will the extensive and intensive use of information- and communication
technology increase the risk of catastrophic incidents, and make societies more
vulnerable faced with war or organised sabotage?
♦ Will a commercialised Internet really give the universal access to information
that many today believe will come?
While the answer to these questions remain to be found, the leading voices in the
policy system, and apparently most other people, are clearly optimistic about the
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impact of information- and communication technology on the future society. The
suspicion does remain, however, that the most fundamental motivations for
promoting the information and communication technology “revolution” is related to
the simple and obvious: The spread and use of networked computers and information
systems is crucial for the future of American information and communication
technology industry itself. This is considered important for two reasons: Information-
and communication technology industry itself is among the strongest growing
American industries (in terms of revenues, profits as well as employment growth),
and is expected to continue to grow for years to come. Information and
communication technology is one of the technology areas where the US maintains
world leadership, and most Americans are eager to see this lead maintained.
A recent analysis of the importance of technical standards express the logic of the
final point succinctly:
“Standards make good sense for industry and consumers. The participants develop-
ing a standard have business advantage over outsiders. Standards development,
maintenance, and administration have complex and soon-to-be-obsolete business
model: Income is mainly from sales of documents, which are about to be spread for
free on the internet. … The Department of Commerce would be a good funding
source because the world would adapt US national standards as international stan-
dards. US companies and industries would have a business advantage over other in-
ternational competitors in an international economy because the US was the devel-
oper of the standards. In other words … the US would be able to flood the market in
many areas (not just the internet) which would have a huge competitive advantage
for US industries. The cost of temporary funding would easily be overshadowed by
the increase in US business activity in the world market.”50
Reflecting on our initial problem formulation, the four main conclusions of this
chapter are the following:
There may well be an element of determinism in the perception of lay people when
observing the development of microelectronics technology. The so-called Moore’s
Law – which crudely speaking states that the power of microelectronics components
doubles every 18 months – is an example of a regularity that in some people’s mind
appears as a quasi-natural law. Apart from this, there is little or no determinism in the
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US debate on information and communication technology. Knowledgeable people
are well aware that the development in microelectronics is pushed ahead by
conscientious commercial efforts and R&D efforts. Thanks to such efforts, a techno-
economic potential is presently being realised and the economic benefits harvested.
The expected impact on culture and society are perceived as so significant that many
talk about this period as a revolutionary period. However, in most cases, the real
economic and social impact remains uncertain.
1. The lack of determinism is reflected in the other main feature of the ICT debate
in the US: While the linear thinking about science, technology and business has
played an important ideological role during the Cold War period, the situation is
now that many policy makers (and others) are acutely aware that the
development of ICT and the diffusion of new technology is a systemic effort on a
societal level. The efforts to develop a national, indeed a global information
infrastructure is construed as an interactive collaborative effort where all the
main institutions –  Business, Government and Academia – have to play
important roles.
2. The real lacuna in the US policy debate is in the critical evaluation of what
“information society” really will bring. Attention is being paid to negative
consequences of the new socio-technical system that is emerging, in that issues
such as privacy and protection of children are being discussed. However, with
respect to fundamental questions concerning the net effect of information and
communication technology on employment, on personal freedom, and on quality
of life in general, concern appears to be an exclusive interest of peripheral
interest groups. The central policy makers are marked by strong technology
optimism. It is not certain whether this is rooted in a perception of an almost
universal consensus that information society should be happening – so that
opposing it is politically impossible and in any case futile –, or if they seriously
believe the ICT revolution to be a new industrial revolution, as important as the
previous industrial revolution, so that opposing is wrong and as narrow-minded
as the efforts of the ludites of 19th century Britain.
The US has been the leading developer of information and communication
technology during the whole post World War II period. In many areas, the country
continues to be leading the way in science and technology, both in the industrial and
in the academic sectors. There is a strong will among Americans to keep this
advantage and use the control that it gives over technology to promote American
interests and to secure the welfare of Americans.
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Chapter 5: The International IT-policy Discussion: OECD
In our last section we focus on a forum for the international discussion that combines
various currents in the IT policy discussion in the US, EU and other member states.
Further, it combines (or attempts to combine) the political with theoretical
discussions. In this respect, the discussion at this international Organization for
Economic Coordination and Development can be seen as a hybrid of the
international policy discussion and is a good place to conclude our critical survey.
We will find that the OECD documents are especially instructive in exploring the
role of the government.
5.1. The OECD and the international IT-discussion
The OECD is an international forum in which member governments, including the
US and the EU, are integrated into a kind of dialogue for common policy
discussions. The expressed purpose of the OECD is to promote policies whose
objectives include the achievement of ‘sustainable economic growth, employment
and rising standard of living’. Since the Organisation’s inception in 1960, IT-policies
have enjoyed a fairly central position in these discussions. In particular the
Organization has long addressed the ongoing need for more reliable and comparable
cross-country data about Information Technology and the similarly unrelenting need
to provide dependable analyses concerning the development of the IT field. This type
of information, for which the OECD’s Committee for Information, Computer and
Communications Policy (ICCP) has been responsible, is essential to a genuine
policy-discussion at the international level.
In this section we focus on two recent ICCP documents on a subject we already have
met both in the US and the European discussions: the theme concerns the ‘global
information society’. Together these documents attempt to identify common policy
challenges and potential solutions - often fairly specific - “that fully exploit the
contributions of advances in technology” in a global context. The documents are:
• OECD/ICCP: Global information infrastructure—Global Information Society
(GII-GIS): Policy Requirements. (79pp)
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• OECD/ICCP: Global information infrastructure—Global Information Society
(GII-GIS): Policy Recommendations for Action (19pp)
As their names indicate, these two documents are related. The longer document
concerning ‘policy requirements’ is in fact a background document for the
considerably more succinct ‘policy recommendations’ document.51 Together the
globalisation documents represent one of a growing list of voices in the international
IT discussion that are concerned with integrating national and regional policies at the
‘global level’. We noted above the G-7’s “shared vision of human enrichment”
efforts (1995), we noted the EU’s Ministerial Declaration on the Global Information
Networks (1997), and we noted the policy discussion in the US concerning the
‘Global Information Infrastructure’. In their input to this discussion the OECD is
attempting to use its position as a multinational policy forum to help define common
ground, to spell out general and specific challenges and to make policy
recommendations.
These documents will be treated together in this section in order to study how
information technology is perceived, how general IT-policies are argued for and how
the governmental role is conceived. These issues will be treated with reference to
other OECD documents, especially the recent Information Technology Outlook 1997
report, which includes a policy survey of Member States (Norway included). Another
important document is the OECD’s “Technology, Productivity and Job Creation”
report which argues that the OECD economies are undergoing a fundamental change
in how they grow.
5.2. Information technology and how the OECD argue for IT-policies
Behind the GII_GIS title lies an ambitious attempt to integrate the principally
techno-economic concerns of the infrastructure-policy discussion together with the
“societal goals and ambitions” associated with the information society perspective.
On the one hand there is the focus on network access, network provision and the
propagation of ‘core sets of services’, namely e-commerce and multimedia. The
familiar emphasis here is on the stimulation of economic growth and productivity,
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the creation of new economic activities and work. Thus the first part of the title
stresses, “the importance in developing global information infrastructures in terms of
creating economic activity and jobs”. However, ‘a number of social benefits’ are also
attached to information and communication technologies broadly defined. Under the
Global Information Society part of the title, the OECD argues IT policies argue for
IT policies as a means to realise broader goals. The OECD thus recognises, “the
necessity to use these developments to improve societal goals and aspirations.”
(Policy Requirements, p. 8) Here the focus is on ‘improved education opportunities,
improved health care delivery etc’ and other services that tomorrow’s ‘seamless’
networks can accommodate. In addition there is brief mention supporting ‘cultural
and linguistic diversity’.
Unfortunately, the techno-economic and the societal perspectives do not sit
comfortably together in the documents, but instead remain separate as the ungainly
GII–GIS title indicates. Apparently the schism between the infrastructure perspective
and the information society perspective reflects a rift between the differing concerns
of the ministers representing the different member states. Whatever the case—and
despite the OECD’s insurance that the two perspectives receive equal emphasis— it
is clear that the relationship between the techno-economic and the societal concerns
is not as ‘seamless’ as the global information networks it prioritises. The main focus
is, from its policy implications, clearly on the first.
Let us look more closely at the argument of these documents. In doing so we will
find that the ‘social benefits’ are largely integrated in with the economic goals, not to
say made synonymous with them. The documents address a, ‘need to review existing
policy frameworks to facilitate the transition to an information society.’ (p. 14) The
argument behind such a necessity is familiar from the IT-discussion from the late 80s
and early 90s. It runs basically as follows: the convergence of previously separate
technologies and industries (telematics, computers, broadcasting and other ‘content’
industries is precipitating the need to reappraise older policies. In addition, the
increasing tendency of satellite and other technologies to ignore national frontiers not
only contributes to the need for ‘reregulation’ but argues that it should occur not at
the national but at the international level. In an era in which most if not all of its
member states are in the process of liberalising their telecommunications markets,
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the OECD is arguing that the current reregulation process should not be nationally
but internationally oriented. The premise for this complaint is that, “present
communication market structures and policy frameworks in many OECD countries
are not yet conducive to support the rapid and efficient development of information
infrastructures and multimedia applications or the development of electronic
commerce.” (Recommendations, p.19)
Based on this diagnosis, the policy recommendations are concerned with a laundry
list of measures to ensure the, “development and integration of high speed
communication networks, and a set of core services and applications in digital
format, into global integrated networks capable of seamless
delivery.”(Recommendations, p. 7) This list includes:
• The availability and diffusion of high-speed interactive infrastructures
• Fair access to and use of infrastructures for both customers and service providers
• The interconnection and interoperability of infrastructures and services;
• Growth and development of multimedia services
• Transaction and information safeguards which ensure privacy, confidentiality of
information and security of payments, and protection of intellectual property.
This list is concerned with technological development although the recommendations
are not of the technology-push cast. There is however a ‘technology-nudge’ policy
here, in the sense that the constant upgrade of technical infrastructure is advocated.
Infrastructure in a broader sense is also the objective when the Recommendations
argue for international convergence of policy around standard ‘principles’;
compatible legal and regulatory platforms for questions concerning privacy,
intellectual property, etc are as essential to 'information superhighways' as
compatible technical platforms. The most remarkable element of this general, mixed
list are its relatively specific demand-side objectives directed at encouraging the
development of "multimedia services" (which are elsewhere linked directly with
OECD jobs).
In this way the OECD recommendations are very much in line with the related US
GII document, the EU Ministerial Declaration and the G-7 ‘core principles’. In
addition, the OECD recommends that its member economies should help developing
economies ‘leap-frog their present status’ by ‘providing them with experiences and
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lessons on regulatory structures and requirements.’ (Requirements, p 10) The
objective is for a functionally global set of standards for infrastructure and for
principles.
In short, the framework of these documents –like those from other fora –are
concerned with influencing, “ the shape of the Information Economy of the 21st
century and the Information Society which accompanies it.” (Recommendations, p 5)
In that order of priority: the techno- economic forces first, after which society is
apparently expected to follow. One is however left in considerable doubt about the
consistency of this relationship, which at places is proclaimed in such non-sequiturs
as, “Electronic commerce represents the core element in realising these economic
and social potentialities.” (Requirements, p. 8. emphasis added) One is left asking,
what these potentialities might be and how electronic commerce or ‘seamless global
networks’ can directly address relevant social concerns.
The documents do not help us with such questions. This is apparently because the
real vision of this relationship is located elsewhere, in the Technology, Productivity
and Job Creation document that the GII-GIS argument repeatedly refers to. In this
central OECD document, one associates long-term productivity growth and
employment with the advent of new technologies, in a new kind of growth. This
economic growth is expected to bring about social improvements. The documents
before us allude to this argument in what it confusingly calls a ‘new growth model’
in order to conclude that,  “it is this vision which can become reality by taking
concrete and rapid changes to make appropriate reforms of implementing global
information infrastructures and global information society.” (Recommendations, p.
19) It does not seem that the ‘vision’ is clearly enough stated to warrant ‘taking
concrete changes’(sic) however rapidly. The discrepancy between ‘vision’ and
reality is decidedly greatest when one starts talking of ‘implementing global
information society’. Such bids at political sound-bites only highlight a glaring lack
of reflection on what an ‘information society’ might entail, not to mention a ‘global’
one. And as to how one expects to ‘implement’ a ‘society’, remains extremely
unclear semantically but also in terms of the role of governments.
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5.3. How the governments’ role is envisioned
In the last section we survey what role is envisioned for the government in “taking
concrete and rapid changes.” It is arguably here that these OECD documents are
most interesting, as they draw on the experiences of the member states.
In the globalisation documents, the OECD is concerned with drawing fairly clear
lines of responsibility between the roles of the government (individually and
collectively) and the roles of the private sector. As elsewhere in the international IT-
discussion, great pains are taken to emphasise the primary importance of the private
role, apparently to differentiate today’s situation as clearly as possible from the
intense regulatory climate of the ‘pre-convergence’ era. It is against this background
that opportunities are emerging for governments to ‘contribute to further
enhancement of public goals.’ (Recommendations, p. 3)
Because these are transnational policy papers, they are of course most concerned
with suggesting guidelines for this sort of 'enhancement'. However, there is some
confusion at just how active and just how passive governments should be.
Governments are delegated an ill-defined role in taking a “pro-active response to
GII-GIS developments and applications”. The role of government is seen as
stimulating development, opening market possibilities, removing barriers to
competition and ‘growth’, and stimulating demand for new services. In doing so,
governments are warned not to be over-active in their role. The caveat that, “it is
important to understand that the dynamics of change are largely technology and
private-sector driven” (Recommendations, p. 5) is reminiscent of the techno-
determinism arguments, in which society and governments are ascribed passive
roles. Yet this is not necessarily the advised reading in the OECD documents. The
OECD is, in other passages in these documents and more centrally in the Information
Technology Outlook 1997 report concerned in defining a “catalytic role” to the
public sector. A survey of what this role entails is compiled from the ‘policy
requirements’ document. It involves an arms-distance set of functions as well as a
hands-on set. The functions prescribed are as follows:
Governments should play a ‘catalytic role’ to:
• Promote and encourage investment by the private sector
• Stimulate new demand.
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• Stimulate public demand for on-line services
• Promote strategic research and development programs,
• Launch user-oriented pilot projects and promotional activities,
• Provide test-beds for experimentation and promote international co-operation in
these areas.
Governments should also integrate these technologies in their own daily activities,
both internally and vis-à-vis their public
• use new electronic delivery systems and software to provide the means to
significantly enhance the internal efficiency and productivity of public
administrations.
• use new electronic media to the greatest possible extent for the delivery of their
core public services. (public information and cultural resources, databases for
health services, web sites at local, regional and national levels and public
libraries and databases)
• encourage social adaptation to the new electronic environment via public
information and training programs on the increasing range of services and
public access points available.
The arms-distance functions (the first set) are fairly standard and familiar from
elsewhere in the international discussion and do not necessitate further comment.
The second set of hands-on functions is the newer and more interesting set of
initiatives, which we have seen first and foremost in the EU document Building the
European Information Society for us all. The role of the public sector in promoting
Electronic Information Services by effectively and organically integrating
information technology into governmental administration and into the government-
citizen interface can be an effective way to encourage the development and diffusion
of information technology with promise. Training and education are likewise seen as
important areas for governments to act to bring the economic objectives in line with
the social realties of our ‘information society’.
5.4. Conclusion
We have seen that, true to its name, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development is most concerned with the cooperation of member states in adapting
their policy frameworks and focusing on the economic development that the
maturing technologies – principally of multimedia and electronic commerce – are
expected to carry with them. The documents reviewed here seem to reflect the
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political difficulties of moving towards a ‘global information society’, in which some
governments prefer to pursue one set of policies while others prefer other
approaches. Information technology is in these documents seen as somehow larger
than ‘infrastructure’ but smaller than an ‘information society’.
What is perhaps most instructive about these documents and their reflection on the
wider international discussion around IT-policies involves the role envisioned for the
government. The catalytic role advocated here – with extensive reference to the
policies of member countries—is indicative of a concern to promote the role for the
private sector. This is a hallmark of the current international IT-discussion that
should be contrasted to the comprehensive role the regulatory has enjoyed in
telecommunication policies. Also indicative of the current discussion is the
increasing focus on education and training as an important part of the so-called
information society, as well as the active integration of information technology into
governments themselves.
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6. Conclusions
The recent international policy discussion can be characterized by three broad and
related tendencies: first, the body of recent policy intiatives is growing rapidly;
second, it is becoming more and more explicitly global in its focus; and, third and
most importantly, its policy-orientation is changing direction and becoming broader.
Indeed, the IT-policy discussion during the 90s involves an increasing number and
increasing diversity of policy initiatives. The sheer number of IT-related documents
in the EU, for example, could fill a moderate-sized library. At the same time,
however, there is a contradictory tendency that seems to run across (developed)
countries. As the details of the individual ICT-discussions multiply and collectively
broaden, the international ICT-discussion in fact seems to tend towards an increasing
degree of policy consensus. Where the early and mid-90s saw a great deal of policy-
headlines of the sort ‘EU’s way into the Information Society’, the recent discussion
is studded by slogans about ‘global cooperation’. There is some degree of agreement
(but also some conflicts) on the collective international norms and standards that are
to underlie a ‘global information society’. This “Globalising” perspective is
underlined by certain highly visible evidence of trans-national consensus, such as the
G7 set of ‘eight core principles’ for the Information Society. (cf. box 2.1)
In our critical surveys of the EU, the US and the hybrid OECD IT-policy discussion,
the most important tendency we find is a gradual but fundamental re-orientation of
the basic policy perspective. The IT policy discussions that extended into the 80s
concentrated principally on trying to build up the competitive strength of the
domestic IT sector52. This phase was characterised by a strong current of ‘technology
push’ type policies in which different sectors of the IT-sector were emphasised (e.g.
semi-conductors). In this phase, IT policy was firmly planted in industrial policy
where the technology push focus was often combined with an ‘infant industry’
rationale. More recently, greater emphasis has been placed on stimulating the
diffusion of new technologies, for example by stimulating demand through ‘market
pull’ policies. Because the IT industry has been its own greatest customer, this type
of demand-side or ‘market pull’ policy remained in a many case the territory of
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industrial policy. What we see in parts of our analysis is an attempt to transcend the
duality of a ‘technology push, market pull’ policy discussion. The tendency is
towards an ‘integrationalist’ innovation-system oriented perspective’, which escapes
the confines of technological deterministic industrial policy, and views technology in
terms of its inter-relationship with society. The most interesting aspect of this gradual
reorientation is that the IT-discussion is finally investigating the –society side of the
‘information-society’ term in a serious manner.
                                                                                                                                         
52
 One classic example from Norway was the STRAP-IT programme from 1985.
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Appendix 1: The Information Society Policy Office’s
(ISPO) survey of past, current and future EU IT-
Policy Actions
The following information is taken from ISPO’s  “Rolling Action Plan Web page”,
found  at http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/legreg/rap2.doc. The ISPO web-page is
directly related to The European Commission’s ROLLING ACTION PLAN FOR
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: COM(96) 607 and  covers  EU legal and
regulatory actions related to the Information  Society. The types of EU items that are
included are:
1. Communications,
2. Decisions,
3. Directives,
4. Recommendations,
5. Green Papers
6. Other (e.g. Conferences)
ISPO has here classified these items according to the four themes set out in the
document entitled Europe’s way to the Information Society: an Action Plan (Com
(94) 347 final). ISPO is a combined effort between Directorate General III and
Directorate General XIII.
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A. FORTHCOMING ACTIONS
A.1. IMPROVING THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
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A.2. INVESTING IN THE FUTURE
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A.3. PEOPLE AT THE CENTRE
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 7KHGHYHORSPHQWRIQHZDXGLRYLVXDODQGLQIRUPDWLRQVHUYLFHVZLOOUHTXLUHQHZW\SHVRISURJUDPPHFRQWHQWDVZHOODVQHZZD\VRISURGXFLQJDQGILQDQFLQJ
LW,WZLOODOVRRIIHUQHZRSSRUWXQLWLHVLQWHUPVRIFXOWXUDODQGOLQJXLVWLFGLYHUVLW\7KHDQDO\VLVRIWKHVHLVVXHVZLWKDYLHZWRLGHQWLI\LQJZD\VRIHQFRXUDJLQJ
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( VHUYLFHV WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIQHZVHUYLFHVZLOOFRPSOHPHQWRWKHULQLWLDWLYHVUHODWHGWRWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWLQDXGLRYLVXDODQGLQIRUPDWLRQVHUYLFHV2Q
WKHWKH&RXQFLOGLVSOD\HGDEURDGPHDVXUHRIDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VDSSURDFKLQWHUPVRIEHWWHUFRRUGLQDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHV
DQGFORVHUFRRSHUDWLRQDQGLVDZDLWLQJWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRPPXQLFDWLRQDQGDSURSRVDOIRUDUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ
 *UHHQ3DSHURQDFFHVVWRSXEOLFVHFWRULQIRUPDWLRQ 4 7KH*UHHQ3DSHULVSXEOLVKHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH,1)2SURJUDPPH,WZLOOLQYLWHDSXEOLFGHEDWHRQWZRPDLQLVVXHVFLWL]HQVDFFHVVWRSXEOLF
LQIRUPDWLRQDQGH[SORLWDWLRQRISXEOLFVHFWRULQIRUPDWLRQE\SULYDWHLQIRUPDWLRQFRQWHQWSURYLGHUVLQGHYHORSLQJYDOXHDGGHGVHUYLFHV
 *UHHQ3DSHURQSXEOLFSURFXUHPHQW³3LVWHVGHUHIOHFWLRQ
SRXUO¶DYHQLU´
 7KH*UHHQ3DSHULVLQWHQGHGWRSURYLGHDIUDPHZRUNIRUDZLGHUDQJLQJGHEDWHRQDQXPEHURILVVXHVFHQWUDOWRWKH&RPPXQLW\¶VSUHVHQWDQGIXWXUHSXEOLF
SURFXUHPHQWSROLF\2QHRIWKHLVVXHVDGGUHVVHGLVHOHFWURQLFSURFXUHPHQWDQGWKHNH\UROHRIHOHFWURQLFWHQGHULQJLQIXUWKHUHQKDQFLQJWUDQVSDUHQF\DQG
DFFHVVWRSXEOLFSURFXUHPHQW

1(:
*UHHQ3DSHURQDFFHVVWROLEUDULHV 4 7KH*UHHQ3DSHUZLOOH[DPLQHWKHUROHDQGIXQFWLRQLQJRIOLEUDULHVDQGWKHQHZFXOWXUDODQGVRFLHWDOFKDOOHQJHVWKDWPXVWEHFRQIURQWHGLQRUGHUWRSURYLGH
WKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQWREULGJLQJWKHJDSEHWZHHQNQRZOHGJHDQGQHZWHFKQRORJLHV,WVKRXOGLQLWLDWHDGHEDWHRQDEURDGUDQJHRILVVXHVLQFOXGLQJLQWHUDOLD
SXEOLFDFFHVVWRHOHFWURQLFLQIRUPDWLRQDQGZRUNVDVZHOODVFRUUHODWHGFRS\ULJKWDQGRWKHUDFFHVVULJKWVDVSHFWVORQJWHUPDYDLODELOLW\RIVXFKLQIRUPDWLRQ
HWF
A.4. MEETING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE
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$&7,217,7/($1’7<3( ’$7( ’(6&5,37,21
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHUHQFHDW*OHYHORQ
VWDQGDUGLVDWLRQDVSHFWVRILQIRUPDWLRQ
VRFLHW\
 7KH&RQIHUHQFHLVPDUNHWIRFXVHGDQGDLPVWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHWLPHO\DQGFRKHUHQWGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH*OREDO,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\*,6E\LGHQWLI\LQJDQGSURPRWLQJ
WKHUHVROXWLRQRIRXWVWDQGLQJVWDQGDUGLVDWLRQLVVXHV
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHUHQFHRQWKHUG
DQQXDOLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\)RUXPZLWK
&((&V

 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHUHQFHZLWK/DWLQ
$PHULFDQFRXQWULHVRQ,6
4
 5RXQG7DEOHRQLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\ZLWK
5XVVLD
 6XSSRUWZLOOEHJLYHQWRWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRID5RXQG7DEOHZLWK5XVVLDRQLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\7KHURXQGWDEOHVKRXOGWDUJHWJRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV
DVVRFLDWLRQVLQGXVWU\DQGUHVHDUFKERGLHV

1(:
1HJRWLDWLRQVRQ,QIRUPDWLRQ
7HFKQRORJ\$JUHHPHQWV,7$
5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVRQGXW\UHGXFWLRQVIRU
LQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\SURGXFWV1HZ
5RXQGRIQHJRWLDWLRQV
 )ROORZLQJWKHDSSURYDORQRIWKH6LQJDSRUH'HFODUDWLRQRQZKLFKZDVDSSURYHGE\DFULWLFDOPDVVRIFRXQWULHVDFFRXQWLQJIRURIWKHZRUOG¶V,7PDUNHW
DQGZKLFKIRUHVHHVWKHHOLPLQDWLRQRIWDULIIVIRURIWKHZRUOG¶V,7PDUNHWLQIRXUVWHSVE\WKH\HDUDQHZURXQGRIQHJRWLDWLRQVLVVFKHGXOHGWRVWDUWLQ
2FWREHUZLWKDYLHZWRUHYLHZDQGRUH[SDQGWKHVFRSHRIWKHH[LVWLQJDJUHHPHQW
STEP report R-14/1998
74
B. PENDING AND ON-GOING ACTIONS
B.1. IMPROVING THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
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$&7,217,7/($1’7<3( ’$7( ’(6&5,37,21

83'$7(
'HFLVLRQRQWKHDOORFDWLRQRIZLGHVFUHHQ
EURDGFDVWIXQGLQJIRUWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI
DGYDQFH79VHUYLFHVLQ(XURSH

4
4
7KHOHJDOEDVLVIRUWKLVDFWLRQSODQH[SLUHGRQWKRI-XQHLQOLQHZLWKWKH&RXQFLOGHFLVLRQ((&VRQRIXUWKHUFDOOVIRUSURSRVDOZLOOEH
ODXQFKHGDQGQRPRUHIXQGLQJZLOOEHDOORFDWHG1RZWKDWZLGHVFUHHQVHUYLFHVDUHDYDLODEOHLQDOO0HPEHU6WDWHVWRJHWKHUZLWKZLGHVFUHHQ79VHWVWKHPDUNHW
IDLOXUHZKLFKEORFNHGFRPPHUFLDOLVDWLRQRIWKHQHZVFUHHQIRUPDWKDVEHHQRYHUFRPH,QWKHOLJKWRIWKLVVXFFHVVIXORXWFRPHWKH&RPPLVVLRQZLOOQRWSURSRVHD
IROORZXSWRWKLVDFWLRQSODQ0DUNHWLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHDFWLRQSODQZLOOFRQWLQXHXQWLOWKHHQGIROORZLQJWKHDQQRXQFHPHQWRIWKHUHVXOWVRI&DOOIRU
EURDGFDVWLQJDQGSURJUDPPHSURGXFWLRQLQ-XO\

83'$7(
'LUHFWLYHRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIRSHQQHWZRUN
SURYLVLRQ213WRYRLFHWHOHSKRQ\DQGRQ
XQLYHUVDOVHUYLFHIRUWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVLQD
FRPSHWLWLYHHQYLURQPHQW


4
7KH'LUHFWLYHUHYLVHVDQGUHSODFHVWKHH[LVWLQJ'LUHFWLYH(&RQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI213WRYRLFHWHOHSKRQ\
,WGHVFULEHVWKHVFRSHRIWKHXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFHIRUWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVZKLFKPXVWEHDYDLODEOHWRDOOXVHUVLQWKH(8DQGUHTXLUHV0HPEHU6WDWHVWRHQVXUHWKDW
WKLVVHUYLFHLVDIIRUGDEOHWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWQDWLRQDOVLWXDWLRQV
7KH'LUHFWLYHDOVRVHWVRXWKDUPRQLVHGFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHSURYLVLRQRIIL[HGSXEOLFWHOHSKRQHQHWZRUNVDQGSXEOLFO\DYDLODEOHWHOHSKRQHVHUYLFHVLQWKH(8
 'LUHFWLYHRQDUHJXODWRU\WUDQVSDUHQF\
PHFKDQLVPLQFOXGLQJLQDQQH[WKH
&RPPLVVLRQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQ


7KHGRFXPHQWSURSRVHVDQLQWHUQDOPDUNHWPHFKDQLVPZKLFKZRXOGHQVXUHWKDWDQ\QHZQDWLRQDOSURSRVDOVIRUUHJXODWLRQRIQHZVHUYLFHVZRXOGEHWUDQVSDUHQW
DQGFRKHUHQWZLWKH[LVWLQJLQWHUQDOPDUNHWSULQFLSOHV

029('
)520
$
H[
'LUHFWLYHRQWKHOHJDOSURWHFWLRQRI
FRQGLWLRQDODFFHVVVHUYLFHV


7KH'LUHFWLYHZDVDGRSWHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQDVDIROORZXSWRWKH*UHHQ3DSHURQWKHOHJDOSURWHFWLRQRIHQFU\SWHGVHUYLFHVDGRSWHGRQDQGWKH(3
5HVROXWLRQRI,WDGGUHVVHVWKHOHJDOSURWHFWLRQRI79DQGUDGLREURDGFDVWLQJDQGLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\VHUYLFHVRIIHUHGWRWKHSXEOLFDWDGLVWDQFHZKHUH
DFFHVVLVVXEMHFWWRSD\PHQW6XFKVHUYLFHVLQFOXGHSD\79YLGHRRQGHPDQGPXVLFRQGHPDQGHOHFWURQLFSXEOLVKLQJHWF

1(:
5HFRPPHQGDWLRQRQLPSURYLQJDQG
VLPSOLI\LQJWKHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWIRU
EXVLQHVVVWDUWXSV


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B.2. INVESTING IN THE FUTURE
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$&7,217,7/($1’7<3( ’$7( ’(6&5,37,21
 'HFLVLRQRQDVSHFLILF57'SURJUDPPH
LQ,QIRUPDWLRQ7HFKQRORJLHV(635,7


)RFXVHGFDOOVIRUSURSRVDOVZHUHKHOGRQ'HF0DU-XQ6HSWDQG'HF$WOHDVWWZRFDOOVLQ7KHSURJUDPPHFRQWULEXWHVWRSURYLGLQJ
WHFKQRORJLHVVWDQGDUGVDQGEHVWSUDFWLFHVIRULQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\$VSHFLDOLQLWLDWLYHWRSURPRWHHOHFWURQLFFRPPHUFHKDVEHHQODXQFKHG

83'$7(
'HFLVLRQRQDVSHFLILF57'SURJUDPPH
RQ$GYDQFHG&RPPXQLFDWLRQV
7HFKQRORJLHVDQG6HUYLFHV$&76


7KH$&76SURJUDPPHKDVEHHQLPSOHPHQWHGWKURXJKWZRPDMRUFDOOVIRUSURSRVDOVLQ6HSWHPEHUDQG6HSWHPEHU,WQRZLQYROYHVDERXW
RUJDQLVDWLRQVLQFRRSHUDWLYHWHFKQRORJ\GHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVDQGRYHUWULDOVRQ1DWLRQDO+RVWLQIUDVWUXFWXUHV$OOPDMRU(XURSHDQLQGXVWULDOLQWHUHVWVDUH
LQYROYHGDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQVIURPRYHUGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHVSDUWLFLSDWH$WKLUG&DOOZDVRSHQHGRQ-XQH2-&ZLWKDFORVLQJGDWHRI6HSWHPEHU


83'$7(
'HFLVLRQRQDVSHFLILF57'SURJUDPPH
RQ7HOHPDWLFV$SSOLFDWLRQV


7KHILUVWFDOOIRUSURSRVDOVFORVHGRQDQGDVHFRQGFDOORQDQGDWKLUGFDOOFORVHGRQ$IXUWKHUFDOOLVWREHODXQFKHGRQDQG
FORVHGRQPDLQFDOODQG,QWHJUDWHG$SSOLFDWLRQVIRU'LJLWDO6LWHV7KHWK&DOO5HVHDUFK1HWZRUNLQJZLOOEHODXQFKHGRQ7KH
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHGHSOR\PHQWRIVHUYLFHVDQGSRVVLEOHDFWLRQVDUHEHLQJDVVHVVHGLQDUHDVVXFKDVKHDOWKFDUHSXEOLFDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVHGXFDWLRQDQGWUDLQLQJ
OLEUDULHVDQGUHODWHGDUHDVWUDQVSRUWXUEDQDQGUXUDOGHYHORSPHQWUHVHDUFKQHWZRUNVGLVDEOHGDQGHOGHUO\SHRSOH
 'HFLVLRQRQDVSHFLILF57'SURJUDPPH
LQWKHILHOGRIWUDQVSRUW



7KHILUVWFDOOIRUSURSRVDOVFORVHGRQDQGDVHFRQGFDOORQ$WKLUGFDOOZLOOEHODXQFKHGRQZLWKDFORVLQJGDWHRIWKH
7KHSURJUDPPHFRQWULEXWHVWRLQWHJUDWLQJLQWRWKHWUDQVSRUWV\VWHPDQXPEHURIWHFKQRORJLHVOLQNHGWRWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\QRWDEO\7HOHPDWLFVWRROV7KH
SURJUDPPHZLOODOVRDVVHVVWKHSRWHQWLDOSROLF\LPSDFWRIWKHXVHRIVXFKWHFKQRORJLHV
 'HFLVLRQRQDVSHFLILF57'SURJUDPPH
RQWDUJHWHGVRFLRHFRQRPLFUHVHDUFK
76(5


5HVHDUFKLQWRWKHVRFLRHFRQRPLFDVSHFWVRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\DUHDPDMRUWKHPHRIWKHSURJUDPPH7KHILUVWFDOOWRRNSODFHLQDQGWKHVHFRQGLQ
&XUUHQWSURMHFWVLQFOXGHVRFLRHFRQRPLFDQDO\VHVRIXVHUSURGXFHULQWHUDFWLRQDSSOLFDWLRQLQWKHVHUYLFHVVHFWRUDQGOHDUQLQJDSSOLFDWLRQV7KHVHFRQGFDOO
LQFOXGHVSDWKZD\VWRD(XURSHDQ,6TXDOLW\RIZRUNLQJGRPHVWLFVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOOLIHDQGHIIHFWLYHLQWURGXFWLRQRI,&7LQWRHGXFDWLRQDQGWUDLQLQJ
 'HFLVLRQRQWKHWK)UDPHZRUN
3URJUDPPH
,WZLOOEHIROORZHGE\SURSRVDOVIRUWKH
VSHFLILFSURJUDPPHV


7KHGUDIWWK)3FRQFHQWUDWHVRQDOLPLWHGQXPEHURIWRSLFVDQGFUHDWHVVWURQJOLQNVEHWZHHQUHVHDUFKDQGWKHQHHGVRIFLWL]HQVDQGLQGXVWU\,WDOVR
FDOOVIRUJUHDWHUFRRUGLQDWLRQERWKZLWKLQWKHSURJUDPPHDQGZLWK0HPEHU6WDWHUHVHDUFKDVZHOODVJUHDWHUPDQDJHULDOIOH[LELOLW\7KHSURSRVDOLGHQWLILHVWKUHH
WKHPDWLFWKHOLYLQJZRUOGDQGWKHHFRV\VWHPDXVHUIULHQGO\LQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\FRPSHWLWLYHDQGVXVWDLQDEOHJURZWKDQGWKUHHKRUL]RQWDOSURJUDPPHVWKH
LQWHUQDWLRQDOGLPHQVLRQUHVHDUFKLQQRYDWLRQDQG60(VWKHKXPDQSRWHQWLDO

1(:
/HRQDUGRGD9LQFL3URJUDPPH  $FDOOIRUSURSRVDOVZDVLVVXHGZLWKDGHDGOLQHVWRI$SULO3URSRVDOVLQFOXGHSURPRWLQJDFFHVVWRVNLOOVDQGSURPRWLQJWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIYRFDWLRQDOVNLOOV
WKURXJKWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIOLIHORQJOHDUQLQJ6RPHSURSRVDOVZHUHUHFHLYHGGHDOLQJZLWKERWKWUDLQLQJLQ,&7UHODWHGVNLOOVDQGIRUFKDQJLQJ
VNLOOUHTXLUHPHQWVLQUHODWLRQWRQHZ,&7DSSOLFDWLRQV6HOHFWHGSURMHFWVZLOOVWDUWE\WKHHQGRI

1(:
7DVN)RUFHHGXFDWLRQDOPXOWLPHGLD 
4
4
$MRLQWFDOOIRUSURSRVDOVZRUWK0(&8ZDVLVVXHGLQE\WKH7DVN)RUFH3DUWLFLSDWLQJSURJUDPPHVLQFOXGH(VSULW7HOHPDWLFV$SSOLFDWLRQV7DUJHWHG
VRFLRHFRQRPLFUHVHDUFK7(17HOHFRP6RFUDWHVDQG/HRQDUGRGD9LQFL7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHFLVLRQRQWKHVHOHFWHGSURSRVDOVLVH[SHFWHGE\PLG6HSWHPEHU
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B.3. PEOPLE AT THE CENTRE
,632

$&7,217,7/($1’7<3( ’$7( ’(6&5,37,21
213 'HFLVLRQRQWKH$'$37%,6&RPPXQLW\
,QLWLDWLYHXQGHUWKH6WUXFWXUDO)XQGV


7KH$'$37%,6EXLOGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\&RPPXQLW\,QLWLDWLYHZLOOUHLQIRUFHWKHVXSSRUWFXUUHQWO\JLYHQWRIDFLOLWDWLQJWKHDGDSWDWLRQRIZRUNHUVWRWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ
VRFLHW\DQGWKHFUHDWLRQRIQHZMREVLQSDUWLFXODU60(VDQGWRHYDOXDWLQJDQGSURPRWLQJLQQRYDWLRQVLQZRUNRUJDQLVDWLRQ
214 'HFLVLRQRQWKH6,0$36\VWpPH
G
,QIRUPDWLRQSRXUOHV0DUFKpV3XEOLFV


7KHILUVW6,0$3SURMHFWVZHUHODXQFKHGLQ-XO\DQGHQWHUHGWKHLUSLORWSKDVHLQ1RYHPEHUZLWKWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIDOO0HPEHU6WDWHVDVZHOODV1RUZD\
6ZLW]HUODQGDQG,FHODQG6,0$3DLPVWRSUHSDUHWKHZD\IRUWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIHOHFWURQLFWHQGHULQJSURFHGXUHVIRUSXEOLFSURFXUHPHQW(OHFWURQLFWHQGHULQJZLOOEH
IXUWKHUDGGUHVVHGLQWKHIRUWKFRPLQJ*UHHQ3DSHURQ3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQW
215 'HFLVLRQRQ,'$3URJUDPPH7HOHPDWLF
LQWHUFKDQJHRIGDWDEHWZHHQ
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQV



2YHUWUDQV(XURSHDQ7HOHPDWLFVSURMHFWVDUHEHLQJLPSOHPHQWHG,'$XVHUV(&DQGDJHQFLHVRWKHU(XURSHDQLQVWLWXWLRQV0HPEHU6WDWHVDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVZLOO
JUDGXDOO\PLJUDWHWRWKHXVHRIFRPPRQ7HOHPDWLFVVHUYLFHVZKLFKZLOOEHSURYLGHGWKURXJK7(67$7UDQV(XURSHDQ6HUYLFHVIRU7HOHPDWLFVEHWZHHQ
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQVZKLFKLVH[SHFWHGWREHLQRSHUDWLRQWRZDUGVWKHHQGRI
216
UPDATE
'LUHFWLYHFRQFHUQLQJWKHSURFHVVLQJRI
SHUVRQDOGDWDDQGWKHSURWHFWLRQRI
SULYDF\LQWKHWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVVHFWRU
LQSDUWLFXODULQWKH,QWHJUDWHG6HUYLFHV
'LJLWDO1HWZRUNV,6'1DQGLQWKHSXEOLF
GLJLWDOPRELOHQHWZRUNV


)ROORZLQJWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKHJHQHUDOGLUHFWLYHVHHSURJUHVVLVEHLQJPDGHRQWKLVPHDVXUHZKLFKSURYLGHVDVSHFLILFVHWRIVDIHJXDUGVEDVHGRQWKHJHQHUDO
GLUHFWLYHEXWDGDSWHGWRWKHWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVVHFWRU,WLVFHQWUDOWRPDLQWDLQLQJSXEOLFFRQILGHQFHLQWKHHPHUJHQFHRILQSDUWLFXODUSHUVRQDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQVLQ
WKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
218
UPDATE
+LJK/HYHO([SHUW*URXSRQWKH6RFLDO
DQG6RFLHWDO$VSHFWVRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ
VRFLHW\


4
7KH*URXSSXEOLVKHGLWV)LUVW5HIOHFWLRQVUHSRUW³%XLOGLQJWKH(XURSHDQLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\IRUXVDOO´LQ-DQXDU\7KLVUHSRUWIRFXVHVRQWKHIROORZLQJWKHPHV
HPSOR\PHQWZRUNRUJDQLVDWLRQWKHIXWXUHRIZRUNODERXUPDUNHWVVRFLDOFRKHVLRQUHJLRQDOFRKHVLRQHGXFDWLRQDQGWUDLQLQJKHDOWKFXOWXUHPHGLDDQGGHPRFUDF\
219 ,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\)RUXP 


7KH)RUXPLVFRPSRVHGRIDURXQGPHPEHUVIURPVL[PDLQILHOGVXVHUVRIQHZWHFKQRORJLHVVRFLDOJURXSVFRQWHQWDEGVHUYLFHVSURYLGHUVQHWZRUNRSHUDWRUV
HTXLSPHQW PDQXIDFWXUHV DQG LQVWLWXWLRQV 7KH )RUXP DGRSWHG LWV )LUVW $QQXDO 5HSRUW WR WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ HQWLWOHG 1HWZRUN IRU 3HRSOH DQG WKHLU
&RPPXQLWLHV0DNLQJWKH0RVWRIWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\LQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ$VDUHVXOWRIWKHH[WHQGHGGLDORJXHDPRQJVWLWVPHPEHUVWKH5HSRUWSURYLGHVD
YDOXDEOHFRQWULEXWLRQLQWHUPVRILGHDVDQGUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVFRYHULQJVRFLDOFXOWXUDOSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFDVSHFWVRIWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ
)RULWVVHFRQG\HDURIDFWLYLW\VL[ZRUNLQJJURXSVKDYHEHHQVHWXSRQWKHIROORZLQJLVVXHV(PSOR\PHQWDQG-RE&UHDWLRQ6RFLDODQG'HPRFUDWLF9DOXHV
&XOWXUHDQGWKH)XWXUHRI1HZ6HUYLFHVDQGWKH0HGLD8QLYHUVDO$FFHVVDQG&RQVXPHU3URWHFWLRQDQG6XSSRUW6XVWDLQDELOLW\LQDQ,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\3XEOLF
6HUYLFHV%ULQJLQJ$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ&ORVHUWR&LWL]HQV/LIHORQJ/HDUQLQJ
220
UPDATE
,QWHU5HJLRQDO,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\
,QLWLDWLYH,5,6,
DLQLWLDOUHJLRQV
EIXUWKHUUHJLRQDOVWUDWHJLHV
FLQWHUUHJLRQDOSURMHFWV
5HJLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\LQLWLDWLYH
5,6,
• 5,6,VWUDWHJ\EXLOGLQJ
UHJLRQV
• 5,6,SLORWDSSOLFDWLRQV

!

(6)
5,6,
(5')

5,6,
(5')
,5,6,DWWHPSWHGWRGHPRQVWUDWHDPHWKRGRORJ\EDVHGRQVXEVLGLDULW\DQGDERWWRPXSDSSURDFKIRUFUHDWLQJDZDUHQHVVDPRQJWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLFDQGGHFLVLRQ
PDNHUV7KHVL[SDUWLFLSDWLQJ>1RUWK:HVWRI(QJODQG8.1RUG3DVGH&DODLV)9DOHQFLD(&HQWUDO0DFHGRQLD*5DQG3LHPRQWH,@KDGWRRXWOLQHDVWUDWHJ\RQ
WKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\E\DQDO\VLQJWKHEDVHOLQHVLWXDWLRQDQGDVVHVVLQJWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUEXLOGLQJWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\WKURXJKDFRQFHUWHGHIIRUWEULQJLQJ
WRJHWKHUDOOWKHUHOHYDQWUHJLRQDODFWRUV7KHLQQRYDWLYHQDWXUHRIWKH,5,6,DSSURDFKUHVWVRQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOPHFKDQLVPE\ZKLFKVWUDWHJ\KDVEHHQGHYHORSHGLHD
SDUWQHUVKLSEHWZHHQDOONH\SOD\HUVLQDUHJLRQ7KHVXFFHVVRIWKH,5,6,LQLWLDWLYHVKDVFRQYLQFHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQWRFRQWLQXHLQWKDWGLUHFWLRQZLWKDQHZJHQHUDWLRQ
RILQQRYDWLYHDFWLRQVXQGHU$UWRIWKH(5')DQG$UWRIWKH(6)7KHJHQHUDODSSURDFKDLPVDWHQDEOLQJDQGIDFLOLWDWLQJOHDUQLQJSURFHVVHVZLWKLQDJLYHQUHJLRQ
DQGEHWZHHQUHJLRQV7KHLQLWLDWLYHKDVPHDQWWKDWQHDUO\RIDOOHOLJLEOHUHJLRQVXQGHUWKHVWUXFWXUDOIXQGVDUHFXUUHQWO\HQJDJHGLQWKLVSURFHVVRIVWUDWHJ\
EXLOGLQJDQGRILWVWUDQVODWLRQLQWRDQDFWLRQSODQ
232
NEW
&RXQFLO'HFLVLRQIRUDPXOWLDQQXDO
SURJUDPPHIRUWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\


7KHSURJUDPPHZLOOUXQIURPZLWKDEXGJHWRI0(&8,WLGHQWLILHVWKUHHOLQHVRIDFWLRQ
LQFUHDVLQJSXEOLFDZDUHQHVVVXSSRUWLQJWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\EDVHGRQWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIXVHUQHHGVDQGDSHUPDQHQWLQYHQWRU\RI(XURSHDQ
SROLFLHVDQGSURJUDPPHVPHDVXUHVWRWDNHLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQDQGPDNHXVHRIWKHJOREDOGLPHQVLRQRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
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B.4. MEETING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE
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$&7,217,7/($1’7<3( ’$7( ’(6&5,37,21

83'$7(
'HFLVLRQRQDVSHFLILFSURJUDPPHRQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO57'FRRSHUDWLRQ,1&2RI
WKHWK)UDPHZRUN3URJUDPPHIRU57'


5	'SURMHFWVKDYHDOUHDG\EHHQODXQFKHGZLWKWKLUGFRXQWULHVWKHSURFHVVRIH[HFXWLRQLQWKHILHOGRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQWHFKQRORJLHVDQG7HOHPDWLFVDSSOLFDWLRQV
)XUWKHUFDOOVZLOODGGUHVVLQIRUPDWLRQQHWZRUNVIRU60(VDQGUHVHDUFKFHQWUHVWHOHZRUNLQJ7HOHPDWLFVDSSOLFDWLRQVIRUKHDOWKDQGHGXFDWLRQODQJXDJHHQJLQHHULQJ
DQGWKHFUHDWLRQRIDQHWZRUNRI,QQRYDWLRQ5HOD\&HQWUHV
 *3LORW3URMHFWV  $VDUHVXOWRIWKH*FRQIHUHQFHLQ%UXVVHOVLQ)HESURMHFWVKDYHEHHQODXQFKHG*OREDO,QYHQWRU\3URMHFW*OREDO,QWHURSHUDELOLW\RI%URDGEDQG1HWZRUNV
&URVVFXOWXUDOHGXFDWLRQDQGWUDLQLQJ%LEOLRWKHFD8QLYHUVDOLV0XOWLPHGLDDFFHVVWRZRUOGFXOWXUDOKHULWDJH(QYLURQPHQWDQGQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVPDQDJHPHQW
*OREDOHPHUJHQF\PDQDJHPHQWLQIRUPDWLRQQHWZRUNLQLWLDWLYH*OREDOKHDOWKFDUHDSSOLFDWLRQV*RYHUQPHQW2QOLQH*OREDOPDUNHWSODFHIRU60(V0DULWLPH
LQIRUPDWLRQ6\VWHPV
 ,QIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\)RUXPZLWK&HQWUDO
DQG(DVWHUQ(XURSH3UDJXH
)ROORZXSDFWLRQVRQLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
LQWKH&((&V


,Q-XQHWKHILUVW)RUXPRQWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\ZDVKHOGZLWKWKHFRXQWULHVRI&HQWUDODQG(DVWHUQ(XURSH$IROORZXSPHHWLQJRIWKH)RUXPWRRNSODFHLQ
6HSWHPEHULQRUGHUWRGHYHORSDZRUNSODQ)RXUWKHPDWLFSDQHOVZHUHVHWXSLQRUGHUWRSUHSDUHWKHQH[WPHHWLQJRIWKH)RUXPVWUDWHJ\DQGSROLF\IRU,6
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH$FWLRQ3ODQHGXFDWLRQDQGWUDLQLQJDSSOLFDWLRQRILQIRUPDWLRQDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\LQSXEOLFDGPLQLVWUDWLRQV
$Q$FWLRQ3ODQKDVEHHQGUDZQXSRXWOLQLQJDQXPEHURIIXWXUHDFWLRQV
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHUHQFHRQ³WKH
FUHDWLRQRIWKH(XUR0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
LQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\´5RPH
)ROORZXSRI(XUR0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
&RQIHUHQFH



7KHFRQIHUHQFHIRFXVHGRQWKHFRJQLWLYHGLPHQVLRQRIWKH,6DQGWKHUHJXODWRU\EDVLVIRULWVGHYHORSPHQW:RUNVKRSVZHUHKHOGRQUHVHDUFKQHWZRUNV
WHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVUHJXODWRU\DVSHFWVDQGIRUHGXFDWLRQDOGLPHQVLRQ7KHVHDFWLRQVZHUHODXQFKHGDVDIROORZXSRIWKH0LQLVWHULDO(XUR0HG&RQIHUHQFHLQ
%DUFHORQD
)ROORZLQJWKHFRQIHUHQFHDIROORZXS$FWLRQ3ODQLVEHLQJSUHSDUHGZKLFKZLOOLQFRUSRUDWHWKUHHW\SHVRIPHDVXUHVGLDORJXHPHDVXUHVZRUNVKRSVWUDLQLQJ
SURJUDPPHVDQGUHJLRQDOSLORWDQG5	'SURMHFWV
 ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRI'LUHFWLYH
((&$SULORQWKH
DSSUR[LPDWLRQRIWKHODZVRIWKH0HPEHU
6WDWHVFRQFHUQLQJWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
WHUPLQDOHTXLSPHQWLQFOXGLQJWKHPXWXDO
UHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHLUFRQIRUPLW\0XWXDO
5HFRJQLWLRQ$JUHHPHQWV05$V
QRZ $UWRIWKLV'LUHFWLYHVWDWHVWKDW(XURSHDQUHJXODWRU\ERGLHVVKDOOUHFRJQLVHGRFXPHQWDWLRQLVVXHGE\WKLUGFRXQWU\UHOHYDQWERGLHVZKHQDJUHHPHQWVEHWZHHQ
WKH&RPPXQLW\DQGWKHWKLUGFRXQWU\FRQFHUQHGKDYHEHHQFRQFOXGHG
$PDQGDWHKDVEHHQJLYHQE\WKH&RXQFLOWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQWRQHJRWLDWH05$VIRUWKHUHJXODWHGDUHDVE\ZKLFKSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHVZLOOUHFRJQLVHWKHYDOLGLW\RI
FHUWLILFDWHVLVVXHGLQWKHWHUULWRU\RIWKHRWKHUFRXQWU\
1HJRWLDWLRQVDUHFXUUHQWO\WDNLQJSODFHEHWZHHQWKH(8DQG86$&DQDGD1HZ=HDODQG$XVWUDOLD6ZLW]HUODQGDQG-DSDQ
3UHOLPLQDU\PHHWLQJVKDYHWDNHQSODFHZLWK.RUHD6LQJDSRUHDQG,VUDHOLQ

1(:
'HFLVLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKH:,32
&RS\ULJKWV7UHDW\DQGWKH:,32
3HUIRUPDQFHVDQG3KRQRJUDPPHV7UHDW\
4
4
7KH&RPPXQLW\KDYLQJDOUHDG\VLJQHGWKHVHWZRWUHDWLHVLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRSURFHHGZLWKWKHLUUDWLILFDWLRQIRUPDWWHUVIDOOLQJXQGHU&RPPXQLW\FRPSHWHQFHVHH
LQ&

1(:
:,321HJRWLDWLRQVRQDXGLRYLVXDO
SHUIRUPDQFHVDQGRQVXLJHQHULV
SURWHFWLRQRIGDWDEDVHV
2QJRLQJ
DFWLYLW\
)ROORZLQJWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKH:,32&RS\ULJKWV7UHDW\DQGWKH:,323HUIRUPDQFHVDQG3KRQRJUDPPHV:,32LVFXUUHQWO\GLVFXVVLQJWKHH[WHQVLRQRISURWHFWLRQ
RISHUIRUPHUVWRDXGLRYLVXDOSHUIRUPDQFHVDVZHOODVD7UHDW\RQWKHSURWHFWLRQRIGDWDEDVHVUHTXLULQJVXEVWDQWLDOLQYHVWPHQW7KHVHUHSUHVHQWPDMRULVVXHVIRUWKH
&RPPXQLW\DQGWKH&RPPLVVLRQFRQVLGHUVLPSRUWDQWWRUHDFKDSRVLWLYHUHVXOWLQWKHQHDUIXWXUH

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C. ACCOMPLISHED ACTIONS
C.1. Improving the business environment
,632

$&7,217,7/($1’7<3( ’$7( ’(6&5,37,21
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQFRQVXOWDWLRQRQ
,QIUDVWUXFWXUH*UHHQ3DSHUV
 5HSRUWRQWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHSXEOLFFRQVXOWDWLRQRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ
VSURSRVDOIRUDFWLRQ
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHSUHVHQWVWDWXV
DQGIXWXUHDSSURDFKIRURSHQDFFHVVWR
WHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVQHWZRUNVDQG
VHUYLFHV2SHQ1HWZRUN3URYLVLRQ213
 7KH&RPPXQLFDWLRQFRQILUPHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH213SULQFLSOHVRIRSHQDQGHIILFLHQWDFFHVVLQWKHOLEHUDOLVHG7HOHFRPHQYLURQPHQWIURP,WFRQVLGHUHG
WKHVFRSHRIDSSOLFDWLRQRI213DQGODXQFKHGWKHGHEDWHSULRUWRWKHVXEPLVVLRQRIOHJLVODWLRQDWWKHHQGRI

83'$7(
&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHIROORZXSWRWKH
*UHHQ3DSHURQFRS\ULJKWDQGUHODWHG
ULJKWVLQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
 7KH&RPPXQLFDWLRQVHWVRXWWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHFRQVXOWDWLRQH[HUFLVHDQGDQQRXQFHVWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQWHUQDOPDUNHWSROLF\LQWKHDUHDRIFRS\ULJKWVDQGUHODWHG
ULJKWVLQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ8QLYHUVDO6HUYLFHLQ
WHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
 %XLOGLQJRQWKHFRQVHQVXVHVWDEOLVKHGDURXQGWKHLQIUDVWUXFWXUH*UHHQ3DSHUWKH&RPPLVVLRQSUHVHQWHGDVXUYH\RIWKHOHYHODQGDYDLODELOLW\RIXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFH
ZLWKLQWKH(8,WDOVRGUHZWRJHWKHUWKHHOHPHQWVRIWKHSDFNDJHUHODWLQJWRXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFHWRSURSRVHDVWUHQJWKHQLQJRIWKHFRQFHSWRIYRLFHWHOHSKRQ\
VHUYLFHVLQSDUWLFXODUZLWKUHJDUGWRDIIRUGDELOLW\DQGTXDOLW\RIVHUYLFH,WDOVRH[DPLQHGWKHLPSDFWRIXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFHRQUHJLRQDODQGVRFLDOFRKHVLRQFULWHULDIRU
LWVHYROXWLRQRYHUWLPHDQGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFHDQGWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQIROORZXSWR*UHHQ
3DSHURQPRELOH	SHUVRQDO
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV


7KH&RPPXQLFDWLRQUHSRUWHGRQWKHYLHZVH[SUHVVHGLQWKH&RQVXOWDWLRQRQWKH0RELOH*3DQGSURSRVHGFRQFUHWHPHDVXUHVDQGDWLPHWDEOHWRDFWRQWKH
FRQVHQVXVZKLFKHPHUJHG2QWKHEDVLVRIWKLVSROLWLFDOVXSSRUWZDVVRXJKWIURPWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHIXWXUH
GHYHORSPHQWRIWKHPDUNHWLQGLUHFWRULHV
DQGRWKHUWHOHFRPLQIRUPDWLRQVHUYLFHVLQ
DFRPSHWLWLYHHQYLURQPHQW
 7KHFRPPXQLFDWLRQKLJKOLJKWHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIGLUHFWRU\VHUYLFHVLQWKHJHQHUDOFRQWH[WRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\DQGGHVFULEHGWKHJXLGHOLQHVDQGSULQFLSOHV
ZKLFKKDYHEHHQVHWRXWIRUGLUHFWRU\VHUYLFHVLQYDULRXVGLUHFWLYHVDQGRWKHU&RPPXQLW\DFWV%RWKWKH(3DQGWKH&RXQFLOUHDFWHGSRVLWLYHO\WRWKH
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ3UHVLGHQF\FRQFOXVLRQVRIVW0DUFK7HOHFRP&RXQFLODQG(3UHVROXWLRQRIQG0D\
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQZLGHUXVHRI
VWDQGDUGLVDWLRQWRVXSSRUW(8SROLF\

 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ³6WDQGDUGLVDWLRQDQG
WKHJOREDOLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\7KH
(XURSHDQDSSURDFK´
 7KHDLPRIWKLV&RPPXQLFDWLRQLVWRH[DPLQHKRZLQWKHOLJKWRIWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKH,&7PDUNHWDQGWKH,&7VWDQGDUGVSURFHVVWKHEHVWSRVVLEOHFRQGLWLRQV
FDQEHFUHDWHGIRUWKHGUDZLQJXSRIVWDQGDUGVQHHGHGIRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\DQGWRLQGLFDWHE\ZKDWPHDQVWKH&RPPXQLW\LQWHQGVWR
SURPRWHWKRVHDVSHFWVIRUZKLFKLWKDVSDUWLFXODUUHVSRQVLELOLW\
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHGLUHFWLYHRQ
PXWXDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIW\SHDSSURYDOIRU
WHUPLQDOV
 7KHUHSRUWZDVSXEOLVKHGRQWKHWKRI0DUFK
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQIRUWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI
DGYDQFHGWHOHYLVLRQVHUYLFHVLQ(XURSH
 )LQDQFLDOVXSSRUWPHFKDQLVPWRDVVLVWEURDGFDVWHUVDQGSURJUDPPHSURGXFHUVZLWKH[WUDFRVWVRILQWURGXFLQJZLGHVFUHHQIRUPDW7KHVFUHHQIRUPDWLV
WKHRQO\JOREDOO\DJUHHGSDUDPHWHUIRUWKHIXWXUHRI79LQFOXGLQJ+'79,WHPERGLHVFLQHPD79FRQYHUJHQFH3XEOLFDWLRQRIDFDOOIRUEURDGFDVWLQJDQG
SURJUDPPHSURGXFWLRQSURSRVDOVLQ2FW
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKH(8DQGVSDFH
IRVWHULQJDSSOLFDWLRQVPDUNHWVDQG
LQGXVWULDOFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV
 ,WDLPVWRH[SODLQWR&RXQFLODQG(3KRZWKH&RPPLVVLRQVHHVWKHUROHRIWKH(8LQVSDFHWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKHUHFHQWHYROXWLRQRIWKHVHFWRUWRVHHNDJUHHPHQW
RQWKLVDSSURDFKDQGWRRXWOLQHWKHPDLQSULRULWLHVIRUIXWXUHDFWLRQ7KHVHSULRULWLHVZLOOOHDGVXEVHTXHQWO\WRVSHFLILFSURSRVDOVWREHVXEPLWWHGWRWKHUHOHYDQW
ERGLHVFRQFHUQLQJVSDFHWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVVSDFHQDYLJDWLRQDQGHDUWKREVHUYDWLRQ
STEP report R-14/1998
79
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV
RIWKH(XURSHDQLQIRUPDWLRQDQG
FRPPXQLFDWLRQLQGXVWULHV
 7KH&RPPXQLFDWLRQDQDO\VHVWKH(XURSHDQ,&7LQGXVWU\DQGWKHFKDOOHQJHVLWIDFHVDQGSURSRVHVDFWLRQVDLPHGDWLPSURYLQJWKHFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVRIWKH,&7
LQGXVWULHVDQGWKHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWLQZKLFKWKH\RSHUDWH,WFRPSOHPHQWVH[LVWLQJSROLF\LQLWLDWLYHVZLWKDFWLRQVLQVHYHUDODUHDVLQFOXGLQJFRPSOHWLRQRIWKH
DEROLWLRQRIWUDGHWDULIIVRQ,7SURGXFWVLPSURYLQJWKHVWDQGDUGLVDWLRQSURFHVVH[SORLWLQJWKHSRWHQWLDORI(8HQODUJHPHQWDFFHOHUDWLQJWDNHXSIDFLOLWDWLQJWKH
HPHUJHQFHRI60(VHWF
 'UDIW&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ
RIWKHFRPSHWLWLRQUXOHVWRDFFHVV
DJUHHPHQWVLQWKHWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
VHFWRU
 ,WDLPVWRFODULI\WKHFRPSHWLWLRQUXOHVZLOOSOD\LQUHVROYLQJDFFHVVDJUHHPHQWVLQWKH7HOHFRPVHFWRU,WGRHVQRWHVWDEOLVKQHZSULQFLSOHVRIFRPSHWLWLRQODZEXW
GHPRQVWUDWHVKRZWKHSULQFLSOHVH[LVWLQJLQFXUUHQWFDVHODZRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQDQGRIWKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHZLOOEHDSSOLHGWRDQHZW\SHRISUREOHPRFFXUULQJLQWKH
FRQWH[WRIWKHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQRIWKH7HOHFRPVHFWRU,WVHWVRXWDFFHVVSULQFLSOHVVWHPPLQJIURP(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZGHILQHVDQGFODULILHVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
FRPSHWLWLRQODZDQGVHFWRUVSHFLILFOHJLVODWLRQDQGH[SODLQVKRZFRPSHWLWLRQUXOHVZLOOEHDSSOLHGLQDFRQVLVWHQWZD\DFURVVWKHFRQYHUJLQJVHFWRUVLQYROYHGLQWKH
SURYLVLRQRIQHZPXOWLPHGLDVHUYLFHVHVSHFLDOO\WRDFFHVVLVVXHVDQGJDWHZD\V
3XEOLFFRQVXOWDWLRQVHQGRQ
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHDVVHVVPHQW
FULWHULDIRUQDWLRQDOVFKHPHVIRUWKH
FRVWLQJDQGILQDQFLQJRIXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFH
DQGJXLGHOLQHVIRUWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVRQ
WKHRSHUDWLRQRIVXFKVFKHPHV
 ,QRUGHUWRDVVLVW0HPEHU6WDWHVLQSUHSDULQJQDWLRQDOUHIRUPVLQDGYDQFHRIIXOOOLEHUDOLVDWLRQRI7HOHFRPLQWKLV&RPPXQLFDWLRQLGHQWLILHVWKHSULQFLSDO
HOHPHQWVWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQZLOODVVHVVLQORRNLQJDWQDWLRQDOXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFHVFKHPHVZKLFKPXVWEHQRWLILHGWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQE\WKHHQGRI,WDOVR
SURYLGHVGHWDLOHGJXLGHOLQHVEXLOGLQJRQWKHH[LVWLQJSULQFLSOHVZLWKLQ&RPPXQLW\ODZZKLFKDUHGHVLJQHGWRGHYHORSEHVWSUDFWLFHLQQDWLRQDODSSURDFKHVWRWKH
FRVWLQJDQGILQDQFLQJRIXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFH
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQD&RPPXQLW\
VWUDWHJ\DQGIUDPHZRUNIRUWKH
GHSOR\PHQWRIURDGWUDQVSRUWWHOHPDWLFVLQ
(XURSHDQGSURSRVDOVIRULQLWLDODFWLRQV
 7KH&RPPXQLFDWLRQLVEDVHGRQWKH&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQRIRQWKHGHSOR\PHQWRIURDGWUDQVSRUW7HOHPDWLFV,WZDVHODERUDWHGZLWKWKHKHOSRIWKH+LJK
/HYHO*URXSRQURDGWUDQVSRUW7HOHPDWLFVFUHDWHGLQ'HFHPEHU,WSURSRVHVDQRYHUDOO(XURSHDQVWUDWHJ\DQGIUDPHZRUNWRFDUU\RXWWKLVGHSOR\PHQWZLWK
OHJLVODWLRQWHFKQLFDOKDUPRQLVDWLRQDQGFRRUGLQDWLRQRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGILQDQFLQJRI57'SURMHFWVQRWDEO\WKURXJKWKH7(17HOHFRPEXGJHW
,WDOVRSURSRVHVLQLWLDODFWLRQVLQVRPHSULRULW\GRPDLQV

1(:
&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ(8$FWLRQ3ODQRQ
6DWHOOLWH&RPPXQLFDWLRQVLQWKH
,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\
 %DVHGRQDFORVHFRRUGLQDWLRQZLWKWKH(XURSHDQVHFWRU¶VDFWRUVLWDLPVWRIRFXVWKH(XURSHDQLQGXVWULDOSRWHQWLDORQWKHQHZJHQHUDWLRQRIJOREDOVDWHOOLWH
V\VWHPVDGYDQFHGVHUYLFHVDQGLQQRYDWLYHDSSOLFDWLRQVZKLFKPHHWNH\XVHUUHTXLUHPHQWVLQWKHJOREDOLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\QDPHO\SHUVRQDOPRELOLW\IDVW
UHVSRQVHWLPHVJOREDOFRQQHFWLYLW\DQGDFFHVVWRWKHEURDGEDQGHYROXWLRQRIWKH,QWHUQHW

1(:
&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQD(XURSHDQ,QLWLDWLYH
RQ(OHFWURQLF&RPPHUFH
 ,WLGHQWLILHVIRXUNH\DUHDVZKHUHDFWLRQPXVWEHWDNHQDQGLPSOHPHQWHGE\WKH\HDULI(XURSHLVWREHQHILWIURPWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVRI(OHFWURQLF&RPPHUFH
DIIRUGDEOHDFFHVVWRLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSURGXFWVDQGVHUYLFHVDFRKHUHQWUHJXODWRU\VWUXFWXUHDW(8OHYHODIDYRXUDEOHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWDFRPSDWLEOHDQG
FRKHUHQWUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUNDWJOREDOOHYHO

1(:
&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHSURVSHFWVDQG
SRVVLEOHREVWDFOHVWRWKHSURJUHVVRI
(XURSHDQFDSLWDOPDUNHWVIRU60(V
 ,WDLPVWRH[SORUHWKHSRWHQWLDOEDUULHUVWRWKHOLVWLQJRI60(VRQFDSLWDOPDUNHWVWRVWDUWD(XURSHDQZLGHGHEDWHRQWKHDSSURSULDWHFRQGLWLRQVIRUDFFHVVWR
HTXLW\ILQDQFHWRGHVFULEHDQGGUDZDWWHQWLRQWRWKHSURJUHVVPDGHE\YDULRXVLQLWLDWLYHVLQWKH(8VXFKDV($6'$4DQG(XUR10WRRXWOLQHWKHDFWLRQVWKH
&RPPLVVLRQLVFXWWHQWO\WDNLQJDQGLQWHQGVWRWDNHLQWKHIXWXUHWRRYHUFRPHWKHEDUULHUVWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI60(RULHQWHGFDSLWDOPDUNHWVDQGHQVXUHWKHLU
VPRRWKRSHUDWLRQV

1(:
&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
RIWKHWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVUHJXODWRU\
SDFNDJH
 7KHFRPPXQLFDWLRQDVVHVVHVWKHVWHSVWDNHQE\0HPEHU6WDWHVWRLPSOHPHQWWKHSURYLVLRQVRIWKHWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVOLEHUDOLVDWLRQSDFNDJHLQFOXGLQJ
PHDVXUHVDOUHDG\DGRSWHGDQGWKRVHVWLOOSHQGLQJDWWKHWLPHWKHUHSRUWZDVILQDOLVHG

1(:
&RPPXQLFDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKH
FRQVXOWDWLRQRQWKH*UHHQ3DSHURQ
QXPEHULQJVHHSRLQW
 )ROORZLQJWKHSXEOLFFRQVXOWDWLRQRQQXPEHULQJWKH&RPPLVVLRQKDVGUDZQFHUWDLQSROLF\FRQFOXVLRQVLQSDUWLFXODUUHJDUGLQJWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIFDUULHUSUH
VHOHFWLRQWKHDFFHOHUDWHGLQWURGXFWLRQRIQXPEHUSRUWDELOLW\DQGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQ(716EDVHGRQFRGHµ¶3URSRVDOVIRUFRQFUHWHOHJDOPHDVXUHVZLOOEH
VXEPLWWHGGXULQJWKHWKLUGTXDUWHURI

1(:
&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHIXUWKHU
GHYHORSPHQWRIPRELOHDQGZLUHOHVV
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV
 7KHFRPPXQLFDWLRQSUHVHQWVDQRYHUYLHZRIWKHGHYHORSPHQWVLQWKHPRELOHDQGZLUHOHVVPDUNHWVZLWKLQWKH(8DQGVHHNVWRFRQWULEXWHWRWKHGHEDWHRQWKHIXWXUH
HYROXWLRQRIPRELOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVWRZDUGVD8QLYHUVDO0RELOH7HOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV6\VWHP8076DVDNH\FRPSRQHQWRIWKH³ZLUHOHVVLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\´,W
UDLVHVNH\TXHVWLRQVZKLFKPXVWILQGDQDQVZHUWRFODULI\ZKLFKUHJXODWRU\RUVXSSRUWLQJPHDVXUHVDUHQHHGHG,WFDOOVIRUFRPPHQWVWREHVXEPLWWHGE\-XO\


1(:
&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKH:RUOG
5DGLRFRPPXQLFDWLRQV&RQIHUHQFH
:5&
 ,QYLHZRIWKH:5&1RYHPEHUDQGFRQVLGHULQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIUDGLRIUHTXHQFLHVIRUIXUWKHUGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH(8UDGLRFRPPXQLFDWLRQVVHFWRULW
LQIRUPVWKH&RXQFLODQGWKH(3DERXWWKHLVVXHVDWVWDNHLQ:5'LGHQWLILHVKRZDQGZKHUH:5&GHFLVLRQVUHODWHWR&RPPXQLW\SROLF\DQGSURSRVHVQHFHVVDU\
LPSURYHPHQWVRQWKHDSSURDFKWRGHIHQG&RPPXQLW\LQWHUHVWVLQWKHFRQWH[WRI:5&
 'HFLVLRQRQJXLGHOLQHVIRU7(1,6'1  7KHREMHFWLYHLVWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDUDQJHRIVHUYLFHVDQGDSSOLFDWLRQVEDVHGRQ(852,6'1$QXPEHURISURMHFWVKDYHEHHQODXQFKHGLQDQGWKH
FDOOZDVLVVXHGRQ$SULOZLWKDFORVLQJGDWHRIWK-XQH
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 'HFLVLRQIRUJXLGHOLQHVFRYHULQJWUDQV
(XURSHDQ7HOHFRP1HWZRUNV7(1
7HOHFRP


7KHVHJXLGHOLQHVFRYHUWKHREMHFWLYHVSULRULWLHVDQGEURDGOLQHVRIPHDVXUHVHQYLVDJHGIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWUDQV(XURSHDQWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVQHWZRUNVZLWK
VSHFLDOIRFXVRQJHQHULFVHUYLFHVDQGDSSOLFDWLRQV3ULRULWLHVZLOOEHRQSURMHFWVRIVRFLHWDOLQWHUHVWZKLFKKDYHUHDFKHGDKLJKGHJUHHRIPDWXULW\DQGDUH
HFRQRPLFDOO\YLDEOH
 'HFLVLRQRQDFRRUGLQDWHGDXWKRULVDWLRQ
DSSURDFKLQWKHILHOGRIVDWHOOLWHSHUVRQDO
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVHUYLFHVLQWKH&RPPXQLW\
 ,WDLPVWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHUDSLGLQWURGXFWLRQRI63&6VHUYLFHVLQWKH(8RQWKHEDVLVRIWKHSULQFLSOHVJRYHUQLQJWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHWLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKDVLPLODU
WLPHWDEOHDFURVV0HPEHU6WDWHVDQGWKURXJKDFRRUGLQDWHGDSSURDFKRIWKHQDWLRQDO7HOHFRPUHJXODWRU\DXWKRULWLHV,WJLYHVDQLPSRUWDQWUROHWRWKH(XURSHDQ
&RQIHUHQFHRI3RVWDODQG7HOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV$GPLQLVWUDWLRQV&(37DQGFRQWDLQVDEULHIIRUWKH&(37WRKDUPRQLVHE\6HSWWKHIUHTXHQFLHVDQG
DXWKRULVDWLRQFRQGLWLRQVUHODWHGWR63&6+RZHYHUWKHWH[WDOORZVIRUGHFLVLRQDW(8OHYHOVKRXOGWKH&(37QRWPDNHVDWLVIDFWRU\SURJUHVV

1(:
&RPPLVVLRQ'HFLVLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKH
DGGLWLRQDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSHULRGVIRU
'LUHFWLYHV((&DQG(&RQ
IXOOFRPSHWLWLRQLQWKHWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
PDUNHWUHTXHVWHGE\
,5(/$1'32578*$//8;(0%285*
63$,1*5((&(




7KLVVHULHVRIGHFLVLRQVVHWVWKHDGGLWLRQDOWUDQVLWLRQDOSHULRGVIRUWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQLQDOWHUQDWLYHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGSXEOLFYRLFHWHOHSKRQ\FRPSHWLWLRQ
ERWKQHWZRUNVDQGVHUYLFHVXQGHUWKH³)XOO&RPSHWLWLRQ'LUHFWLYH´VHHSRLQWDQGIRUWKHGLUHFWLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQRIPRELOHQHWZRUNVZLWKRWKHUQHWZRUNVRUZLWK
3671LQRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHVXQGHUWKH0RELOH'LUHFWLYH
YRLFHWHOHSKRQ\DOWHUQDWLYHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHYRLFHWHOHSKRQ\DOWHUQDWLYHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHGLUHFWLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQYRLFH
WHOHSKRQ\DOWHUQDWLYHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHYRLFHWHOHSKRQ\YRLFHWHOHSKRQ\DOWHUQDWLYHLQIUDVWUXFWXUH
 'LUHFWLYHDPHQGLQJ&RPPLVVLRQ
'LUHFWLYH((&RI-XO\
UHJDUGLQJWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIIXOO
FRPSHWLWLRQLQWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQPDUNHWV


)ROORZLQJSROLWLFDODJUHHPHQWRQWKHIXOOOLEHUDOLVDWLRQRIYRLFHWHOHSKRQ\VHUYLFHVDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHWKLVPHDVXUHJLYHVOHJDOIRUPWRWKHGDWHRIWKHVWRI-DQXDU\
DQGSURYLGHVIRUSRVVLEOHWUDQVLWLRQDOSHULRGVIRU*UHHFH,UHODQG3RUWXJDO6SDLQDQG/X[HPERXUJVXEMHFWWR&RPPLVVLRQDSSURYDO7KHPHDVXUHDOVR
SURYLGHVIRUHDUO\OLEHUDOLVDWLRQIURPRIDOWHUQDWLYHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVIRUOLEHUDOLVHG7HOHFRPVHUYLFHVDQGVHWVRXWSULQFLSOHVXQGHUWKHFRPSHWLWLRQUXOHVIRU
OLFHQVLQJLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFHQXPEHULQJDQGGLUHFWRU\VHUYLFHV
 'LUHFWLYHDPHQGLQJ&RPPLVVLRQ
'LUHFWLYH((&RI-XO\
UHJDUGLQJWKHDEROLWLRQRIWKHUHVWULFWLRQV
RQWKHXVHRIFDEOH79QHWZRUNVIRUWKH
SURYLVLRQRI7HOHFRPVHUYLFHV


)ROORZLQJSROLWLFDODJUHHPHQWRQWKHHDUO\OLEHUDOLVDWLRQRIDOWHUQDWLYHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHIRUVHUYLFHVZKLFKDUHDOUHDG\RSHQWRFRPSHWLWLRQWKLVPHDVXUHSURYLGHVIRUWKH
XVHRIFDEOHWHOHYLVLRQQHWZRUNVWRGHOLYHUVXFKVHUYLFHVIURP,WDOVRSURYLGHVIRUSRVVLEOHWUDQVLWLRQDOSHULRGVIRU*UHHFH,UHODQG3RUWXJDO6SDLQDQG
/X[HPERXUJVXEMHFWWR&RPPLVVLRQDSSURYDO
 'LUHFWLYHDPHQGLQJ&RPPLVVLRQ
'LUHFWLYH((&RI-XO\
UHJDUGLQJPRELOHDQGSHUVRQDO
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV


7KHPHDVXUHIXOO\RSHQVWKHPDUNHWIRUPRELOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVWRFRPSHWLWLRQDVIRUHVHHQLQWKH0RELOH*UHHQ3DSHU,WSURYLGHVIRUVHOISURYLVLRQRI
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHRUXVHRIWKLUGSDUW\LQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGDOORZVIURPGLUHFWLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQPRELOHQHWZRUNV,WUHTXLUHV0HPEHU6WDWHVWRFRQVLGHU
UHTXHVWVIRUOLFHQFHVIRU'(&7V\VWHPVIURPDQGIRU'&6GLJLWDOPRELOHQHWZRUNVIURP
 'LUHFWLYHRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI213
2SHQ1HWZRUN3URYLVLRQWRYRLFH
WHOHSKRQ\
 7KLVGLUHFWLYHKDVEHHQUHVXEPLWWHGDWWKHXUJLQJRI(3IROORZLQJLWVUHMHFWLRQRIWKH&RXQFLO&RPPRQ3RVLWLRQLQ-XO\WKHFRQFLOLDWLRQSURFHGXUHKDYLQJIDLOHG
RYHUWKHLVVXHRIFRPPLWRORJ\7KHSURSRVDOEXLOGVRQWKHDJUHHPHQWVUHDFKHGEHWZHHQWKH&RXQFLODQGWKH(3GXULQJWKHFRQFLOLDWLRQSURFHGXUH7KH'LUHFWLYH
V
WKUHHIXQGDPHQWDOREMHFWLYHVDUH
GHWHUPLQLQJWKHULJKWVRIWKHXVHUVRIYRLFHWHOHSKRQ\VHUYLFHVLQWKHLUUHODWLRQVZLWKWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVERGLHV
LPSURYLQJDFFHVVIRUDOOXVHUVLQFOXGLQJWKHSURYLGHUVRIVHUYLFHVWRWKHIL[HGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHRISXEOLFWHOHSKRQHQHWZRUNVWKH'LUHFWLYHGRHVQRWDSSO\WRPRELOH
WHOHSKRQHV
HQFRXUDJLQJWKHSURYLVLRQRIYRLFHWHOHSKRQ\VHUYLFHVDW&RPPXQLW\OHYHO
 'LUHFWLYHRQVDWHOOLWHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
OLEHUDOLVDWLRQRIVDWHOOLWHVHUYLFHVDQG
WHUPLQDOV


)ROORZLQJ&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQ&WKH'LUHFWLYHH[WHQGVWKHVFRSHRI'LUHFWLYHV((&DQG((&WRUHPRYHPRQRSROLHVRYHUVDWHOOLWHHTXLSPHQW
DQGVHUYLFHV
 'LUHFWLYHRQWKHXVHRI79VWDQGDUGV  7KH'LUHFWLYHSURYLGHVDUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUNIRUDGYDQFHG79GLJLWDO+'79LQFOXGLQJVWDQGDUGVDQGGHDOVZLWKWKHLVVXHRIFRQGLWLRQDODFFHVVWRGLJLWDO
SD\WHOHYLVLRQIROORZLQJWKHRXWFRPHRIDQLQGXVWU\ZLGHFRQVXOWDWLRQRQWKLVWRSLF
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 'LUHFWLYHRQOHJDOSURWHFWLRQRIGDWDEDVHV


7KH'LUHFWLYHSURYLGHVIRUWKHKDUPRQLVDWLRQRIWKHDXWKRU
VULJKWUHODWLQJWRWKHVWUXFWXUHRIGDWDEDVHVDQGIRUWKHFUHDWLRQRIDQHZULJKWSURWHFWLQJVXEVWDQWLDO
LQYHVWPHQWVPDGHE\PDNHUVRIGDWDEDVHV
 'LUHFWLYHRQLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQLQWKH
FRQWH[WRI213DQGXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFH
 7KLVPHDVXUHSURYLGHVDFRPPRQIUDPHZRUNIRULQWHUFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQVRSHUDWLQJSXEOLFWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVQHWZRUNVLQRUGHUWRHQVXUH³DQ\
WRDQ\´VHUYLFHVWKURXJKRXWWKH&RPPXQLW\,WDOVRVHWVSULQFLSOHVIRUWKHFRVWLQJDQGILQDQFLQJRIXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFH
 'LUHFWLYHXSGDWLQJWKHRSHQQHWZRUN
SURYLVLRQ213DQGOHDVHGOLQHV
GLUHFWLYHV
 $VUHTXLUHGE\&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQ&WKH&RPPLVVLRQWDEOHGPHDVXUHVE\-DQWRLPSOHPHQWWKHUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUNIRUDFRPSHWLWLYH
HQYLURQPHQWLQ7KHDGDSWDWLRQRI213WRWKLVQHZHQYLURQPHQWLVDFHQWUDOHOHPHQW
 'LUHFWLYHRQDFRPPRQIUDPHZRUNIRU
JHQHUDODXWKRULVDWLRQVDQGLQGLYLGXDO
OLFHQVHVLQWKHILHOGRIWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
VHUYLFHV
 7KHGLUHFWLYHOD\VGRZQFRPPRQUXOHVWREHDSSOLHGE\0HPEHU6WDWHVDVUHJDUGVWRWKHSURFHGXUHVDQGFRQGLWLRQVIRUSURYLGLQJ7HOHFRPVHUYLFHV7KLVLVDQ
HVVHQWLDOIHDWXUHRIWKHUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUNWREHLQWURGXFHGDW(8OHYHOZLWKDYLHZWRDIXOO\OLEHUDOLVHGVHFWRUIURP,WZLOOFRQVLGHUDEO\IDFLOLWDWHIUHHGRPWR
SURYLGH7HOHFRPVHUYLFHVLQWKH(8DQGWKHHQWU\RIQHZRSHUDWRUVLQWRWKHPDUNHW,WPXVWEHWUDQVSRVHGE\0HPEHU6WDWHVE\-DQXDU\
 *UHHQ3DSHURQQXPEHULQJ  7KHUDSLGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH7HOHFRPPDUNHWPHDQVWKDWUHIRUPRIWKHQXPEHULQJHQYLURQPHQWZLOOEHLQHYLWDEOH7KLVUHIRUPZLOOQHHGWREHEDVHGRQDQ
DJUHHPHQWRQWKHSROLWLFDOSULRULWLHVVWHPPLQJERWKIURPWKHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQWUHQGDQGIURPFKDQJLQJWHFKQRORJLFDOWUHQGV
7KHWHFKQLFDOZRUNZLOOIROORZRQIURPWKLV7KH*UHHQ3DSHULVLQWHQGHGWRLQLWLDWHDEURDGFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKVHFWRUSOD\HUVRQWKHVHPDWWHUV
 *UHHQ3DSHURQWKHOHJDOSURWHFWLRQRI
HQFU\SWHGVHUYLFHV
 7KH*UHHQ3DSHUDLPVWRLGHQWLI\LQWKHOLJKWRIWKH,QWHUQDO0DUNHWSULQFLSOHVWKHPHDVXUHVQHHGHGWRVDIHJXDUGWKHOHJDOSURWHFWLRQRIHQFU\SWHGVHUYLFHVDWDQ
HTXDOOHYHOWKURXJKRXWWKH&RPPXQLW\,WLVFORVHO\UHODWHGWR,35SURWHFWLRQWRPHGLDSROLF\DQGWRWKH'LUHFWLYHRQVDWHOOLWHDQGFDEOHEURDGFDVWLQJRI
 *UHHQ3DSHURQWKHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQRI
WHOHFRPLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGFDEOH79
QHWZRUNVSULQFLSOHV	WLPHWDEOH3DUW,


7KH*UHHQ3DSHUHVWDEOLVKHVWKHJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHRIWKHIUHHFKRLFHRILQIUDVWUXFWXUHWRGHOLYHUVHUYLFHVDOUHDG\RSHQWRFRPSHWLWLRQ,WSURSRVHVLPPHGLDWHOLPLWHG
DFWLRQDQGOLQNVIXOOFRPSHWLWLRQWRWKHGDWHIRUVHUYLFHVOLEHUDOLVDWLRQ
 *UHHQ3DSHURQWKHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQRI
WHOHFRPLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGFDEOH79
QHWZRUNVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQPHDVXUHV3DUW
,,


7KH*UHHQ3DSHUKDVODXQFKHGDFRQVXOWDWLRQRQWKHLVVXHVUDLVHGE\DOORZLQJFRPSHWLWLRQLQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHIRUWKHEDVLFWHOHSKRQHVHUYLFHDQGWKHUHOHYDQW
VDIHJXDUGV,WVHWVRXWIXWXUHSROLF\RQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQDQGLQLWLDWHVSXEOLFGHEDWHRQWKHLVVXHV
 *UHHQ3DSHURQFRS\ULJKWDQGUHODWHG
ULJKWVLQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
-XO 7KH*UHHQ3DSHULGHQWLILHVLQGHWDLOWKRVHLVVXHVLQWKHILHOGRIFRS\ULJKWZKHUHLQLWLDWLYHVPD\EHQHHGHGZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH,35VH[SORLWHGIRUWKHQHZHOHFWURQLF
VHUYLFHV,WLVEDVHGRQWKHFRQFOXVLRQVRIDKHDULQJZLWKLQWHUHVWHGFLUFOHVLQ-XO\7KHGHDGOLQHIRUZULWWHQVXEPLVVLRQVZDVHQG2FWREHU$KHDULQJRQ
FHUWDLQVSHFLILFTXHVWLRQVLQUHODWLRQWRWHFKQLFDOV\VWHPVRILGHQWLILFDWLRQDQGSURWHFWLRQDQGRQFHUWDLQDVSHFWVUHODWHGWRWKHDFTXLVLWLRQDQGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRI
ULJKWVWRRNSODFHLQ-DQXDU\7KHFRQVXOWDWLRQSURFHVVZDVFORVHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRID&RQIHUHQFHRQWKHPDWWHUKHOGLQ)ORUHQFHLQ-XQH
 5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVUHODWLQJWRWKHOHJDO
DVSHFWVRIHOHFWURQLFGDWDLQWHUFKDQJH
(',
 (',XVHUVDUHUHFRPPHQGHGWRXVHD(XURSHDQPRGHO(',$JUHHPHQWDQG0HPEHU6WDWHVDUHUHFRPPHQGHGWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHXVHRIWKLVPRGHODJUHHPHQWZKLFK
OHJDOSURYLVLRQVDLPDWSURYLGLQJDFRQWUDFWXDODSSURDFKWRWKHOHJDOLVVXHVUHODWHGWRWKHXVHRI(',
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C.2. INVESTING IN THE FUTURE
,632

$&7,217,7/($1’7<3( ’$7( ’(6&5,37,21
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQDPHWKRGRORJ\IRU
WKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRILQIRUPDWLRQ
VRFLHW\DSSOLFDWLRQV
 7KLVFRPPXQLFDWLRQVSURSRVHVDPHWKRGRORJLFDODSSURDFKRIDJHQHUDOQDWXUHIRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIDOOW\SHVRIDSSOLFDWLRQVZKLFKUHSUHVHQWWKHGULYLQJIRUFH
RIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ,QIRUPDWLRQ
6RFLHW\)URP&RUIXWR'XEOLQ7KHQHZ
HPHUJLQJSULRULWLHV
 7KHREMHFWLYHRIWKLVFRPPXQLFDWLRQLVWRLQGLFDWHWKHLPSDFWRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\RQ(XURSHDQ8QLRQSROLFLHVWKHUHE\KLJKOLJKWLQJIXWXUHSULRULWLHV
LPSURYLQJRIWKHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWLQYHVWLQJLQWKHIXWXUHSXWWLQJSHRSOHDWWKHFHQWUHPHHWLQJWKHJOREDOFKDOOHQJH7KHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\&RXQFLORIWKH
ZHOFRPHGWKHLQWHQWLRQRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQWRSUHVHQWDUHYLVHGDFWLRQSODQWRWKH'XEOLQ6XPPLW
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C.3. PEOPLE AT THE CENTRE
,632

$&7,217,7/($1’7<3( ’$7( ’(6&5,37,21
3217 'LUHFWLYH7HOHYLVLRQZLWKRXWIURQWLHUV  5HJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUNIRUWUDQVQDWLRQDOPRYHPHQWRIWHOHYLVLRQEURDGFDVWLQJVHUYLFHV
326
UPDAT
E
&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ7HOHPDWLFV
DSSOLFDWLRQVIRUWUDQVSRUWLQ(XURSH





7KHFRPPXQLFDWLRQSURYLGHVWKHEDVLVIRUDQDFWLRQSODQIRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI7UDQVSRUW7HOHPDWLFVLQ(XURSH)LQDQFLDOHQJLQHHULQJRISXEOLFSULYDWH
SDUWQHUVKLSVQHHGVFORVHUDWWHQWLRQ7KH&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQRIVWUHVVHVWKHQHHGWRLQWURGXFHFRPSDWLEOH7HOHPDWLFVV\VWHPVLQWKHWUDQVSRUWVHFWRU7KH
&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQRI6HSWFRQFHQWUDWHVRQ7HOHPDWLFV$SSOLFDWLRQVLQ5RDG7UDQVSRUWLGHQWLILHVSULRULWLHVIRUVKRUWWHUPDFWLRQVDQGUHFRPPHQGVWKHVHWWLQJXS
RID+LJK/HYHOJURXSWRDVVLVWWKH&RPPLVVLRQZLWKWKHVWUDWHJ\IRUGHSOR\PHQW7KH&RXQFLOUHVROXWLRQRIWKHHPSKDVLVHVWKHQHHGWRDFKLHYH
LQWHURSHUDELOLW\LQWKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIHOHFWURQLFIHHFROOHFWLRQV\VWHPV
327
UPDATE
&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQOHDUQLQJLQWKH
LQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\$FWLRQ3ODQIRUD
(XURSHDQHGXFDWLRQLQLWLDWLYH
 5HTXHVWHGE\WKH(XURSHDQ&RXQFLODW)ORUHQFH-XQHWKHSURSRVHGDFWLRQSODQLVDLPLQJDWLQFUHDVLQJWKHV\QHUJLHVDPRQJQDWLRQDOLQLWLDWLYHVWRSURPRWH
WKHXVHRIQHZWHFKQRORJLHVLQHGXFDWLRQ7KHREMHFWLYHVDUHWRVSHHGXSWKHGLIIXVLRQRIFRPPRQPXOWLPHGLDSODWIRUPVIRUOHDUQLQJWKHGHYHORSPHQWRITXDOLW\
HGXFDWLRQDOFRQWHQWWKHWUDLQLQJRIWHDFKHUVDQGWKHH[FKDQJHRIH[SHULHQFHVWKURXJKVHWWLQJXSD(XURSHDQVFKRROQHWZRUNEDVHGRQWKHLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQRI
H[LVWLQJVFKRROQHWZRUNV7KLVHOHFWURQLFQHWZRUNLVSODQQHGIRUODXQFKEHIRUHWKHHQGRI$SULYDWHIRXQGDWLRQIRUHGXFDWLRQDOPXOWLPHGLDZLOOEHVHWXSLQWKH
DXWXPQRIWRSURPRWHSXEOLFSULYDWHSDUWQHUVKLSV
328 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQKDUPIXODQGLOOHJDO
FRQWHQWRQ,QWHUQHW
 7KH&RPPXQLFDWLRQUHIHUVWRWKHOHJDODQGUHJXODWRU\FKDOOHQJHVSRVHGE\FRQWHQWFLUFXODWLQJRQWKH,QWHUQHWJLYLQJSDUWLFXODUHPSKDVLVRQWKHLVVXHRIKDUPIXO
DQGLOOHJDOFRQWHQW,WSURSRVHVRSWLRQVIRUVKRUWWHUPDFWLRQWRFRPEDWRUFRQWUROVXFKFRQWHQWVHOIUHJXODWLRQWHFKQLFDOSURWHFWLRQPHDQVLPSURYHGLQWHUQDWLRQDO
FRRSHUDWLRQHGXFDWLRQDQGDZDUHQHVV
3122 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ&RKHVLRQDQGWKH
LQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
 ,WDLPVWRRXWOLQHWKHZD\IRUZDUGLQWKHDUHDVRIUHJXODWRU\LQYHVWPHQWDQGGHPDQGSROLFLHVWRHQVXUHWKDWDOO(XURSHDQUHJLRQVFLWL]HQVDQGILUPVDUHHTXDOO\ZHOO
HTXLSSHGWREHQHILWIURPWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVRIIHUHGE\WKHLQIRUPDWLRQ,WDOVRDLPVWRHQVXUHWKDWSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHVPDNHWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\DSULRULW\LQWKHLU
SROLF\DJHQGDDQGLQYHVWPHQWGHFLVLRQVDQGLQYLWHV0HPEHU6WDWHVWRPRYHDZD\IURPPHUHSLORWDFWLRQVDQGLQFUHDVLQJO\LQWHJUDWHWKHPLQWRWKHEURDGVFRSHRI
WKHLUVWUXFWXUDOIXQGVSURJUDPPHV
3121 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHVRFLDODQGODERXU
PDUNHWGLPHQVLRQRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ
VRFLHW\7KHQH[WVWHSV
 7KHGRFXPHQWDVVHVVHVSURJUHVVDFKLHYHGWRZDUGVLQWHJUDWLQJWKHVRFLDOGLPHQVLRQLQWRWKH,6UHODWHGSROLFLHVDQGSUHVHQWVWKHFKDOOHQJHVWKDWKDYHWREHPHW
WRWKHUHFRQFLOHVRFLDOHFRQRPLFDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOREMHFWLYHV,WKDVWKUHHPDMRUREMHFWLYHVUDLVHDZDUHQHVVRIWKHVRFLDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH,6LQWHJUDWHWKH,6
GLPHQVLRQLQVRFLDOSROLFLHVDQGDFWLRQVZHUHUHTXLUHGDQGLGHQWLI\VSHFLILFDFWLRQVDLPHGDWPD[LPLVLQJWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKH,6WRWKHSURPRWLRQDQGVRFLDO
LQWHJUDWLRQ
329 'HFLVLRQRQWKH0HGLD,,3URJUDPPH 


)LQDQFLDOVXSSRUWPHFKDQLVPVIRUNH\VHFWRUVRIWKHSURJUDPPHVLQGXVWU\7KH&RPPLVVLRQ
VSURSRVDOKDVWZRSDUWV
0(',$,,WUDLQLQJ$SURJUDPPHIRUWKHWUDLQLQJRISURIHVVLRQDOVRIWKH(XURSHDQDXGLRYLVXDOSURJUDPPHLQGXVWU\
0(',$,,GHYHORSPHQWDQGGLVWULEXWLRQ7KLVSURJUDPPHDLPVWRSURPRWHWKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIDXGLRYLVXDOZRUNV
330 'HFLVLRQRQJXLGHOLQHVIRUWKHWUDQV
(XURSHDQWUDQVSRUWQHWZRUN 
,QWHOOLJHQWWUDQVSRUWV\VWHPV,76IRUWUDIILFPDQDJHPHQWSRVLWLRQLQJDQGQDYLJDWLRQLVDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKH7UDQV(XURSHDQ1HWZRUNV7UDQVSRUWJXLGHOLQHV7KH\
LQFOXGHWKHQHFHVVDU\WHFKQLFDOLQVWDOODWLRQVDQGLQIRUPDWLRQDQGWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVV\VWHPVWRHQVXUHKDUPRQLRXVDQGHIILFLHQWWUDIILFPDQDJHPHQW$OOWKH
SULRULWLHVRIWKHJXLGHOLQHVVXFKDVFRQQHFWLRQVNH\OLQNVLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVLQWHURSHUDELOLW\SURYLVLRQVUHODWLQJWRWKHHQYLURQPHQWWKHRSWLPLVDWLRQRIFDSDFLW\DQG
HIILFLHQF\VDIHW\DSSO\WR,76DQGUHTXLUHWKHXVHRI,76IRUWKHLUDFKLHYHPHQW
331 'HFLVLRQRQ,1)23URJUDPPH 

$PXOWLDQQXDO SURJUDPPH WR VWLPXODWH WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI D (XURSHDQ PXOWLPHGLD FRQWHQW LQGXVWU\ DQG WR HQFRXUDJH WKH XVH RI PXOWLPHGLD FRQWHQW LQ WKH
HPHUJLQJLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
332 'HFLVLRQRQD0XOWLDQQXDOSURJUDPPH
RQ0XOWLOLQJXDOLVPLQWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ
6RFLHW\3URJUDPPH0/,6


7KHPXOWLDQQXDOSURJUDPPHSURPRWHVPXOWLOLQJXDOLVPLQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\DQGKDVEHHQDOORFDWHGDEXGJHWRI0(&8,WLQFOXGHVWKHIROORZLQJDFWLRQ
OLQHV
D6XSSRUWIRUWKHFUHDWLRQRIDIUDPHZRUNRIVHUYLFHVIRU(XURSHDQ/DQJXDJHV
E(QFRXUDJLQJWKHXVHRIPRGHUQODQJXDJHWHFKQRORJLHVUHVRXUFHVDQGVWDQGDUGV
F3URPRWLQJWKHXVHRIDGYDQFHGODQJXDJHWRROVLQWKH(XURSHDQSXEOLFVHFWRUG$FFRPSDQ\LQJPHDVXUHV
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333 'LUHFWLYHRQWKHSURWHFWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOV
ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHSURFHVVLQJRISHUVRQDO
GDWDDQGRQWKHIUHHPRYHPHQWRIVXFK
GDWD


7KHJHQHUDOGLUHFWLYHSURYLGHVIRUDQXPEHURIULJKWVIRUWKHGDWDVXEMHFWDQGRIREOLJDWLRQVRQWKHFRQWUROOHURIGDWDSURFHVVLQJIDLUSURFHVVLQJTXDOLW\RIGDWDODZ
IXOOQHVVRISURFHVVLQJQRWLILFDWLRQRIFHUWDLQSURFHVVLQJ7KHGLUHFWLYHLVGHVLJQHGWRHQVXUHDKLJKOHYHORISURWHFWLRQIRULQGLYLGXDOVDQGFUHDWHVDOHYHOSOD\LQJ
ILHOGIRUWKHIUHHFLUFXODWLRQRISHUVRQDOGDWDLQWKH&RPPXQLW\7KHSULQFLSOHVRIWKH'LUHFWLYHDSSO\WRDOODUHDVRIWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\DQGZLOOFRQVWLWXWHWKH
EDVLVIRUVSHFLILFUXOHVLQWKHWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVILHOG
334 *UHHQ3DSHU/LYLQJDQGZRUNLQJLQWKH
,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\3HRSOHILUVW
 7KH*UHHQ3DSHUIRUPVWKHEDVLVIRUDZLGHGLVFXVVLRQRQVRFLDOHFRQRPLFDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDOOHQJHVLQWKHFRQWH[WRIHPSOR\PHQWDQGHFRQRPLFVWUXFWXUH
IXWXUHRIZRUNODERXUPDUNHWDQGOHDUQLQJDQGOLYLQJLQWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\
$FRQVXOWDWLYHSURFHVVZDVRIILFLDOO\ODXQFKHGLQD&ROORTXLXPKHOGLQ'XEOLQDQGRUJDQLVHGWRJHWKHUZLWKWKH,ULVK3UHVLGHQF\&RQWULEXWLRQVDQGUHDFWLRQVWRWKH
*UHHQ3DSHUZLOOEHLQYLWHGIURPWKHZLGHVWSRVVLEOHDXGLHQFHXQWLOWKHHQGRI
335 *UHHQ3DSHURQWKHSURWHFWLRQRI0LQRUV
DQG+XPDQ'LJQLW\LQ$XGLRYLVXDODQG
,QIRUPDWLRQ6HUYLFHV

3128 *UHHQ3DSHURQDSDUWQHUVKLSIRUDQHZ
RUJDQLVDWLRQRIZRUN
 7KH*UHHQ3DSHUDLPVDWODXQFKLQJD(XURSHZLGHGHEDWHDPRQJVWDOOWKHPDLQDFWRUVLQSDUWLFXODUVRFLDOSDUWQHUVDQGSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHVDQGWRLQYLWHWKHPWR
GHYHORSDIUDPHZRUNZKLFKZRXOGHQFRXUDJH(8FRPSDQLHVWRLPSURYHWKHIOH[LELOLW\RIWKHLUZRUNRUJDQLVDWLRQZKLOHSURYLGLQJLQFUHDVHGVHFXULW\IRUZRUNHUV7KH
DLPLVWRLPSURYHEXVLQHVVFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVE\GHYHORSLQJQHZIRUPVRIZRUNRUJDQLVDWLRQEDVHGRQKLJKVNLOOVKLJKWUXVWDQGKLJKTXDOLW\7KH*UHHQ3DSHUVKRXOG
EHVHHQLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHLQWHJUDWHGHPSOR\PHQWVWUDWHJ\SURSRVHGE\3UHVLGHQW6DQWHULQWKH&RQILGHQFH3DFW
336 :KLWH3DSHURQ7HDFKLQJDQGOHDUQLQJ
7RZDUGVWKHOHDUQLQJVRFLHW\
 7KLV:KLWH3DSHULVSDUWRIDSURFHVVGHVLJQHGVLPXOWDQHRXVO\WRSURYLGHDQDQDO\VLVDQGWRSXWIRUZDUGJXLGHOLQHVIRUDFWLRQLQWKHILHOGVRIHGXFDWLRQDQGWUDLQLQJ
$IWHUGHVFULELQJZKDWLVDWVWDNHDQGDQDO\VLQJWKHFKDQJHVZKLFKQHHGWREHFRQVLGHUHGZKLOHUHVSHFWLQJWKHSULQFLSOHRIVXEVLGLDULW\WKH:KLWH3DSHUVXJJHVWV
ILYHJHQHUDOREMHFWLYHVIRUDFWLRQVHWWLQJRXWIRUHDFKRIWKHPRQHRUPRUHVXSSRUWSURMHFWVDW&RPPXQLW\OHYHO
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C.4. MEETING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE
,632

$&7,217,7/($1’7<3( ’$7( ’(6&5,37,21
3130 &RPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ
VRFLHW\DQGGHYHORSPHQWWKHUROHRIWKH
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ
 7KH&RPPXQLFDWLRQLVDIROORZXSWRWKH,6$'&RQIHUHQFH,WIRFXVHVRQWKHUHGHILQLWLRQDQGWKHUHRULHQWDWLRQRISUHYLRXVSROLFLHVWRJLYHDKLJKHUSULRULW\LQ
GHYHORSPHQWSROLFLHVWRWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVDQGDSSOLFDWLRQV
337 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHUHQFHDW*
PLQLVWHULDOOHYHORQLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\
%UXVVHOV
 $PHHWLQJRIUHOHYDQW*PLQLVWHUVWRRNSODFHLQ%UXVVHOVRQ)HE7KHPHHWLQJHPSKDVLVHGWKHQHFHVVLW\WRHQFRXUDJHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDZRUOG
ZLGHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\(OHYHQSLORWSURMHFWVZHUHLGHQWLILHGIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQ7KHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH*FRQFOXVLRQVDFURVVWKHGLIIHUHQW(&
SROLFLHVUHODWHGWR,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\LVXQGHUZD\$SURJUHVVUHSRUWRQWKHSLORWSURMHFWZDVSUHVHQWHGDWWKH+DOLID[*PHHWLQJLQ-XQH
338 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHUHQFHRQLQIRUPDWLRQ
VRFLHW\DQGGHYHORSPHQW,6$'LQ6RXWK
$IULFD

6RXWK$IULFDQ9LFH3UHVLGHQW0EHNLSURSRVHGDWWKHRFFDVLRQRIWKH*&RQIHUHQFHLQ%UXVVHOVDQ,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\&RQIHUHQFHZLWKWKHGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV
KRVWHGE\6RXWK$IULFD7KHFRQIHUHQFHWRRNSODFHLQ0D\ZLWKWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIPDQ\GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV&RQWDFWVKDYHEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGZLWKWKH(J\SWLDQ
JRYHUQPHQWIRUWKHSUHSDUDWLRQRIDIROORZXSPHHWLQJ
3221 &RXQFLOGHFLVLRQRQWKH0XOWLODWHUDO
1HJRWLDWLRQVRQEDVLFWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
VHUYLFHVLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH:RUOG7UDGH
2UJDQLVDWLRQ:72
 7KHDJUHHPHQWWRHQWHUIRUFHRQ-DQXDU\ZDVVLJQHGE\FRXQWULHVRQ,WFRPPLWVDOOVLJQDWRULHVWRLPSRUWDQWPHDVXUHVLQSDUWLFXODUWKHPRVW
IDYRXUHGQDWLRQ0)1WUHDWPHQWZKLFKEDQVGLVFULPLQDWRU\PHDVXUHVRQDELODWHUDOEDVLVDVZHOODVOHJDOO\ELQGLQJFRPPLWPHQWVUHJDUGLQJPDUNHWDFFHVVDQG
QDWLRQDOWUHDWPHQW,QDGGLWLRQFRXQWULHVDJUHHGRQDFRPPRQVHWRIUHJXODWRU\SULQFLSOHVDLPHGDWVHFXULQJPRUHHIIHFWLYHDFFHVVDQGQDWLRQDOWUHDWPHQWLQ
SDUWLFXODUWUDQVSDUHQF\IDLUQHVVDQGQRQGLVFULPLQDWLRQLQNH\DUHDVVXFKDVLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQOLFHQVLQJWDULIIVXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFHSURYLVLRQVWHFKQLFDOVWDQGDUGVDQG
IUHTXHQFLHV7KLVDOVRLQFOXGHVDEDQRQDQWLFRPSHWLWLYHSUDFWLFHVVXFKDVFURVVVXEVLGLVLQJDQGGLVJXLVHGEDUULHUVWRPDUNHWDFFHVV7KH&RPPLVVLRQQHJRWLDWHG
RQEHKDOIRIWKH&RPPXQLW\DQGLWV0HPEHU6WDWHV
3222 &RXQFLO'HFLVLRQRQWKH:,32
&RS\ULJKWV7UHDW\DQGWKH:,32
3HUIRUPDQFHVDQG3KRQRJUDPPHV7UHDW\


2QWKH:,32'LSORPDWLF&RQIHUHQFHLQ*HQHYDDGRSWHGWZRQHZWUHDWLHVUHVSHFWLYHO\RQWKHSURWHFWLRQRIOLWHUDU\DQGDUWLVWLFZRUNVDQGRQWKH
SURWHFWLRQRIWKHULJKWVRISHUIRUPHUVDQGSURGXFHUVRISKRQRJUDPV7KHWZRWUHDWLHVSURYLGHIRUDSSURSULDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHWRWKHFKDOOHQJHVIDFLQJ
LQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\SURWHFWLRQLQWKHGLJLWDODJH7KH&RPPLVVLRQQHJRWLDWHGRQEHKDOIRIWKH&RPPXQLW\DQGLWV0HPEHU6WDWHV7KH&RXQFLODGRSWHGWKH
&RPPLVVLRQSURSRVDOUHJDUGLQJWKHVLJQDWXUHRIWKHWZRWUHDWLHVRQEHKDOIRIWKH&RPPXQLW\
3223 &RXQFLO'HFLVLRQRQWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ
7HFKQRORJ\$JUHHPHQW,7$RQWKH
DEROLWLRQRIWUDGHGXWLHVIRULQIRUPDWLRQ
WHFKQRORJ\SURGXFWV




7KH6LQJDSRUH'HFODUDWLRQZDVDSSURYHGRQE\DFULWLFDOPDVVRIFRXQWULHVDFFRXQWLQJIRURIWKHZRUOG¶V,7PDUNHW7KHFRUQHUVWRQHRIWKH,7$LVWKH
HOLPLQDWLRQRIWDULIIVIRULQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\SURGXFWVLQIRXUVWHSVE\WKH\HDU7KH&RPPLVVLRQQHJRWLDWHGRQEHKDOIRIWKH&RPPXQLW\DQGLWV0HPEHU
6WDWHV5HJXODUUHYLHZVDUHIRUHVHHQLQRUGHUWRH[WHQGSURGXFWFRYHUDJHUHPRYLQJVRPHUHPDLQLQJH[FHSWLRQVHQODUJHFRXQWU\FRYHUDJHDQGDFFHOHUDWH
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
3131 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHUHQFHDWPLQLVWHULDO
OHYHORQ³*OREDOLQIRUPDWLRQQHWZRUNV´
%RQQ&RQIHUHQFH
 $WWKLV,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LQLVWHULDO&RQIHUHQFH
PLQLVWHUVIURP(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVDJUHHGRQDQXPEHURINH\SULQFLSOHVWKDWZLOOSDYHWKHZD\IRUDUDSLGJURZWKLQ(XURSHRIWKHXVHRI*OREDOLQIRUPDWLRQ
QHWZRUNV5HSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIOHDGLQJ(XURSHDQEXVLQHVVHVDQGRI(XURSHDQXVHUJURXSVDWWHQGLQJWKH&RQIHUHQFHVXSSRUWHGLQVHSDUDWHVWDWHPHQWVWKLVGULYHWR
VWLPXODWHWKHXVHRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQQHWZRUNVLQ(XURSHDQGEH\RQG7KHPLQLVWHUVXQGHUWRRNWRIXUWKHUGHYHORSWKHLUQDWLRQDOVWUDWHJLHVDQGDFWLRQSODQVDQGWR
VWUHQJWKHQWKHLUFRRSHUDWLRQDWWKH(XURSHDQDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHOLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKH%RQQ&RQIHUHQFHLVDYDLODEOHRQKWWSZZZHFKROXERQQ
Source:The Information Society Policy Office:  http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/legreg/rap2.doc.
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